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Abstract 
Informal employment is the main source of employment in many developing countries, 
where more than 60% of workers work in this informal sector. These workers are mainly 
self-employed or working for small or family businesses who are not protected by social 
protection and regulation of the state. Their economic activities are generally not 
monitored, and the state cannot tax their associated revenues or incomes. This feature 
largely deviates from developed economies and is typically not considered in economic 
analyses.  
This dissertation investigates three main issues in economic research by focusing 
on developing countries with a large informal sector: earnings profiles and uncertainties, 
inequality, and consumption and savings behaviors with policy implications. For our 
analysis, we select Thailand as a representative country because approximately 55% of 
workers are in the informal sector. Moreover, the country has developed social insurance, 
including social welfare programs, social security pension, and universal health insurance 
We first investigate the age-earnings profiles and uncertainties over the life cycle 
between the formal and informal sectors. We examine the sources of earnings growth by 
considering different sectors of employment. Our results show that sector effect is 
statistically significant. We further investigate the difference of earnings shocks between 
the two sectors. We model the earnings shock process allowing for fixed effect, persistent 
shocks, and transitory shocks. Our findings show that earnings shocks in the informal 
sector are greater than in the formal sector; however, the shocks are more persistent in the 
formal sector.  We also allow earnings shocks to vary between age groups in each sector. 
We find that earnings shocks increase with age in both sectors. Our results also show that 
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persistence declines with age in the formal sector while slightly increases with age in the 
informal sector. 
Then, we examine the impact of earnings uncertainties from different sectors on 
earnings and consumption inequality over the life cycle. We develop a life cycle model 
with uninsurable earnings shocks from different sectors of employment. The model is 
calibrated to match Thai data. We find that key factors accounting for earnings and 
consumption inequality are the idiosyncratic earnings shocks in different sectors, working 
during old age, and social security. We also conduct policy experiments to investigate the 
impact of social insurance policy on inequality and individuals’ consumption and saving 
behaviors by proposing two policy reforms: the extension of social welfare and extension 
of the social security system. Our results indicate that a high level of social welfare cannot 
reduce consumption inequality except very young workers and very old persons. 
However, the extension of social security to cover informal workers can reduce 
consumption inequality for middle-aged workers and retired persons.  
Finally, we study the relationship between employment-based / private health 
insurance (EPHI) coverage and private saving in Thailand. Without controlling for 
endogeneity and using the standard Tobit model, our results show that the EPHI insured 
households tend to have positive savings, which is in line with the literature. After 
controlling for endogeneity by using the Instrumental Variables (IV) and the Full Model 
Maximum Likelihood (FMML) approaches, we find that households with EPHI coverage 
have significantly lower savings than those without coverage. Our finding provides 
evidence for the crowding-out effect of health insurance coverage on saving and supports 
precautionary saving theory. 
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1.1 Motivation of the Study 
This dissertation analyzes the age-earnings profiles, earnings uncertainties, inequality, 
and consumption and saving behaviors with their policy implications of developing 
countries. The life-cycle earnings profiles and earnings uncertainties are important 
sources of income or wealth heterogeneity in macroeconomic models to study 
consumption and saving behaviors, inequality, and social insurance. However, the 
existence of a large informal sector in developing countries that makes them different 
from developed countries is an important factor and cannot be ignored. By taking into 
account sectoral differences, it will provide a better understanding of the earnings 
dynamics in developing countries.,  
The study of economic inequality has been associated with income, wealth, and 
consumption. An understanding of the sources of this type of inequality is significant in 
the sense that it relates to the study of consumption and saving behaviors. This also 
explains the ways individuals self-insure themselves against uncertainties. It also 
provides the scope for government policies and interventions, such as social insurance, in 
order to ensure consumption efficiency and maintain people’s living standards. Most of 
the existing literature regarding these issues focuses on developed countries. However, 
the implications of the informal sector on earnings and consumption inequality have not 




We have chosen Thailand for our research study for two main reasons. First, 
Thailand is a large developing economy, where around 55% of the country’s workforce 
is employed in the informal sector. Second, Thailand has a number of developed social 
insurance policies, including social welfare programs, social-security pension, and 
universal health insurance.  
 
1.2 Background Information 
1.2.1 Informal Sector 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines informal employment as those self-
employed persons who work in less-organized small or unregistered businesses as well 
as wage workers who work without employment benefits and social security. Generally, 
the people working in the informal sector lack legal recognition and protection and are 
not supervised by a regulatory body.  
Despite various attempts to formalize the informality of the economy, informal 
employment remains the primary source of income for people in many developing 
countries. A recent report from ILO (2018) states that, globally, more than 60% of the 
total employed population work in the informal sector. The number of workers employed 
in the informal sector varies across countries. Figure 1.1 displays the ratio of informal 
workers to the total in the non-agriculture sector of some selected developing countries. 
The percentage for each country exists between 30% and 80% and could be even higher 






1.2.2 Social Insurance  
Social insurance is a type of support provided by the government for ensuring that its 
people can meet the basic needs. The social insurance provisions of developed countries 
are generous, providing a wide range of coverage. However, for developing countries, 
this type of support is still inadequate. This dissertation broadly focuses on three social 
insurance programs.  
The first program is the social welfare program. Many countries have developed 
programs to fit the needs of their people. They usually consist of several programs 
targeting different groups of people with various requirements. Therefore, it is difficult 
to quantify all the benefits of social welfare of a country and compare it with the others. 
However, Hubbard et al. (2005) attempt to estimate the amount of subsidy in order to 
guarantee the minimum consumption floor in the US by considering Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC), food stamps, and housing subsidies for people aged under 
65. Based the study of a representative female-headed family with two dependent kids, 
the estimated amount of subsidy approximately corresponded to 14% of the GDP per 
capita in 1984. However, for developing countries, the amount of subsidies can be 
relatively much smaller. Thailand is a developing country that has recently introduced 
social welfare programs, including Child Support Grant (CSG) and a welfare card 
program. Following the same criteria as in case of the US, the amount of subsidy provided 
in Thailand was merely 5.5% of the GDP per capita in 2017.  
The second is social security. The social-security pension is a crucial tool for 
ensuring the standard of living of the elderly after retirement and throughout their 




schemes. However, since most of the people in developing countries work in the informal 
sector, they are excluded from such schemes. While 90% of the older persons in 
developed countries receive pension, only less than 50% of those in developing countries 
receive pension (ILO, 2014). Moreover, it should be noted that although some developing 
countries provide a universal old-age benefit to support the elderly, the amount is 
generally small. For instance, in Thailand, the old-age benefit for old people aged 60–69 
years in Thailand is 600 Thai baht a month.1  
The third is public health insurance. Many international organizations have 
encouraged countries to avail universal health insurance covering the entire population, 
including those working in the formal as well as informal sectors (WHO, 2011). The 
public health insurance can help alleviate the burden of overwhelming health 
expenditures and, consequently, impact private savings and insurance decisions. Despite 
the coverage of universal public health insurance, the low-quality and limited access to 
public health services induces people to save more or have private health insurance for 
unexpected health expenditures from using private medical services (Guariglia and Rossi, 
2004). Although Thailand provides universal health insurance that covers both the formal 
and informal sectors, workers in the formal sector receive better coverage owing to their 
employment-based health insurance. Therefore, the informal workers need to save more 
for unexpected medical expenditures that are not covered by public health insurance.  
 
 1.3 Research Strategy and Main Findings 
This dissertation aims to answer the following three questions: 
 




(1) What are the patterns of earnings profile and earnings shocks over the life 
cycle in developing countries? 
First, we investigate the sources of earnings growth by estimating the age-earnings 
profiles of the formal and informal sectors controlling for an individual’s specific 
characteristics, cohort effects, and location effects. We find that workers in the formal 
sector have higher earnings levels and earnings growth than those in the informal sector 
throughout their working lives. Following this, we identify the idiosyncratic components 
of labor earnings shocks, including fixed-effects, persistent shocks, and transitory shocks. 
We allow persistent shocks and transitory shocks to vary across sectors and age groups. 
We find that although the earnings shocks are more persistent in the formal sector, their 
magnitude is greater in the informal sector. In terms of age group, earnings shocks are 
more persistent for those aged between 30–50 and working in the formal sector, while the 
shocks are moderately persistent for the workers of other age groups in the formal sector 
and at all age groups for workers in the informal sector.  
(2) How can earnings uncertainties explain the change of inequality in 
consumption and earnings over the life cycle in developing countries? And how social 
policy reforms affect consumption inequality and consumption and saving behavior? 
We develop a life-cycle model with heterogenous agents facing mortality and 
earnings and employment uncertainties. During the agents’ working age, they face 
different earnings shocks depending on the sector they work in and are allowed to change 
their employment sector in the next period. After retirement, all agents receive old-age 
transfer from the government. Our results show that earnings and consumption inequality 
increase with age. However, our model’s consumption inequality increases faster than the 




the mechanisms of insurance provisions available in Thailand— old-age employment and 
social security. Agents can continue to work after retirement age with a probability to 
retire at every age, and if they work in the formal sector before retirement, they qualify 
for receiving pension. We find that consumption inequality reduces with the presence of 
these two insurance mechanisms, and the model excels further in explaining consumption 
inequality in the data.  
Next, we conduct policy experiments on two selected policies: social welfare 
program and social security pension extension. For the social welfare program, we use 
the amount of subsidies provided by the government as a measure to guarantee the 
minimum consumption floor. We find that a higher level of minimum consumption floor 
cannot reduce consumption inequality significantly, except for very young workers and 
very old persons, and savings among young workers is also reduced. For the extension of 
social security pension, we allow all agents to become eligible for pension after retirement, 
finding that consumption inequality is lower for middle-aged and old-aged persons 
compared to that in the pre-reform scenario.  
(3) What is the relationship between insurance and household saving behavior in 
Thailand? 
We follow the methodology used in Guaiglia and Rossi (2004) to investigate the 
association between employment-based / private health insurance (EPHI) and saving in 
Thailand. Firstly, we use the Tobit estimation controlling for an individual’s specific 
characteristics and find a positive correlation between health insurance coverage and 
saving, it is indicated that those with coverage from the EPHI tend to save more. 
Following this, we apply the Instrumental Variables (IV) technique and a Full Model 




a negative relationship between EPHI coverage and saving, and this effect is considerably 
significant in the FMML approach. Our results evidence the substitution effect between 
saving and insurance.  
 
1.4 Contribution to the Literature 
First, this dissertation contributes to the literature regarding life-cycle earnings profiles 
by incorporating the informal sector which is a unique feature of developing countries 
into the analysis. We have extended the specification from Kambourov and Manovskii 
(2009) in order to control the sector effect for investigating the differences in the earnings 
level and earnings growth of people with the same age but different employment sectors.  
Second, this dissertation contributes to the literature pertaining to the persistence 
of earnings uncertainties over the life cycle. We characterize a process for identifying the 
idiosyncratic components of earnings shocks by allowing sectoral differences in our 
model. It has been highlighted that the existing literature focuses on developed countries 
(Meghir and Pistaferri (2004); Storesletten et al., (2004); Karahan and Ozkan (2013)). 
This study has made an attempt to fill the gaps in the existing literature by estimating the 
components of earnings shocks in the formal and informal sectors of developing countries 
and also allowing them to vary across different age groups.  
The third contribution of this dissertation is that it provides quantitative analyses 
of the impacts of earnings risks on earnings and consumption inequality in developing 
countries by considering the special feature of such countries— the existence of the 
informal sector. This study is the first one to incorporate different earnings risk 




incorporated the mechanisms of insurance arrangements available in Thailand— old-age 
employment and social security— into our analysis. Moreover, we have considered 
implementing some policy reforms to investigate their impacts on consumption inequality 
and saving behaviors.   
Lastly, this study offers empirical evidence to support the precautionary savings 
theory. We have investigated the association between health insurance and saving in 
Thailand. Starr-McCluer (1996) uses the US micro-data in order to examine the 
relationship between the demand for private medical insurance and wealth accumulation. 
Guariglia and Rossi (2004) examine the relationship between insurance and saving in the 
UK.  
 
1.5 Organization of the Study  
The dissertation proceeds as follows. In chapter 2, we estimate the age-earnings profiles 
of the formal and the informal sector. We also characterize an earnings shocks process 
for idiosyncratic components of labor earnings shocks in different employment sectors. 
In chapter 3, we quantitatively investigate the impact of earnings shocks from two 
different sectors on earnings and consumption inequality. We also investigate the effect 
of social policy reforms on inequality and consumption and saving behavior. In chapter 
4, we investigate the effect of private health insurance on private saving in Thailand. In 





1.A Figure  
Figure 1.1 Informal Employment Share (Non-Agriculture, 2012) 
 





























Life Cycle Earnings Profiles and Uncertainties in 
Developing Economies 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Understanding how earnings profiles and uncertainties change over the life cycle is 
essential as they directly affect consumption and saving behaviors, abilities of self-
insurance, and wealth inequality. Moreover, it is a crucial source of income or wealth 
heterogeneity in macroeconomic models to study consumption, saving, risk-sharing, 
inequality, and social insurance. While most existing work on earnings profiles and 
earnings risks has focused on developed countries, this field of study in developing 
countries has not been thoroughly studied in the literature.  
Why do we need to focus on developing countries? First, a remarkable feature of 
developing countries is the existence of informal economy, where economic activities are 
not legally regulated, and the employment relationships are not socially protected. 
Informal employment has often been associated with inferior earnings, lack of legal 
protection, and precarious working conditions. Consequently, they are more vulnerable 
to life cycle uncertainties; for example, earnings or health shocks, which can lead them 
to poverty. Second, the majority of the population in developing countries is engaged in 
the informal sector. More than 60% of the labor force in developing economies are 




workers are informally employed (Bacchetta et al., 2009; ILO, 2018). As the majority of 
the population in developing countries is engaged in the informal sector, they cannot be 
neglected in the economic analysis. 
Therefore, this study focuses on two main issues. First, we aim to examine 
whether being employed in two different sectors has a significant impact on earnings 
growth. We investigate the sources of earnings growth by considering different sectors of 
employment as well as controlling for other factors such as cohort and education. Second, 
we investigate whether earnings shocks in the two sectors share a similar pattern. We 
model the earnings shock process to identify the difference between the formal and 
informal sectors. Our findings show that earnings growth and shocks in developing 
countries have a pattern different from those in developed countries.   
In the literature, most existing work on earnings profiles and persistence of 
earnings shocks over the life cycle has concentrated on developed countries. Kambourov 
and Manovskii (2009) document a significant flattening of life cycle earnings profile and 
increasing inequality for recent cohorts in the US. Lagakos et al. (2018) investigate the 
life cycle wage growth across countries and find that it is significantly higher in developed 
countries than in developing countries. Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) study an income 
process for individual earnings in the US and argue that permanent and transitory shocks 
are important components of income shocks. Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) 
study why earnings and consumption inequality increase with age and find that highly 
persistent earnings shocks can explain the pattern. Karahan and Ozkan (2013) study how 
the persistence of earnings changes over the life cycle and find that it rises with age until 




Studies on formal/informal earnings differential reveal informal workers receive 
earnings lower than those working in the formal sector with same characteristics 
(Dasgupta et al., 2015; Gong & Van Soest, 2002; Tansel & Kan, 2012). However, none 
of them study the life cycle pattern of earnings between the two sectors.  
We begin our analysis by estimating age-earning profiles of the formal and 
informal sectors from the Household Socio-Economic Survey (HSES) conducted by the 
National Statistical Office (NSO) of Thailand. Our finding, higher earnings for workers 
in the formal sector, is in line with the literature related to formal/informal earnings 
differential. Moreover, we find that formal workers, given the same education level, 
experience higher earnings growth than the informal sector over working years.  
Then, we specify an earnings shocks process to identify the idiosyncratic 
components of labor earnings risk. We use panel data from the Townsend Thai Household 
Annual Resurvey, allowing for fixed effects, persistent shocks, and transitory shocks. In 
this study, we apply two earning shock specifications, age-invariant and age-dependent, 
to estimate the autocorrelation coefficient of persistent shocks for workers in different 
sectors. We find that the coefficients of persistent shocks are less than unity for both 
sectors and higher for the formal sector. However, variances of persistent and transitory 
shocks are higher in the informal sector.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 investigates the 
life cycle earnings profiles in different employment sectors. Section 3 explains the income 







2.2 Life-Cycle Earnings Profile 
2.2.1 Data  
In this study, we select Thailand as a representative country because informal 
employment dominates its labor market, with approximately 55% of workers employed 
informally (NSO, 2019). For this analysis, we use the data from the Household Socio-
Economic Survey (HSES) conducted by the NSO from 2002 to 2017 with a two-year 
gap. 2  Each survey interviews around 43,000 households to collect information on 
household and individual characteristics such as their income, expenditure, participation 
in the labor market, education, and socio-economic status.  
The data is restricted to male heads of households, aged 30–59, who are in the 
labor force.3 We select only male workers because, in developing countries, men are more 
likely to engage in a full-time job than women. This study is not restricted to only wage 
workers. This is an important feature of this study as the majority of informal workers in 
developing countries are non-wage workers such as self-employed workers. Focusing 
only on wage workers would lead to selection bias of informal workers.  
 
2.2.2 Identification of Formality/Informality  
The definition of informality differs between countries due to their diverse social and 
economic conditions. Therefore, it is important to point out how this study defines the 
sector of employment for each individual in the sample. We consider two aspects to 
distinguish between formality and informality.  
 
2 Prior to 2006, the survey was conducted once every two years. After 2006, it is conducted annually; 
however, the household income data is reported once every two years. Thus, HSES data used in this study 
is from 2002, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017. 




 First is social protection. According to the ILO (2003), informal workers are 
employees whose employment relationship is not subject to national labor legislation, 
income taxation, social protection, or entitlement to certain employment benefits. 
Second is employment status. Informal employment covers a wide range of 
occupational groups, including street vendors, small farmers, workers in small 
unregistered factories or workshops, etc. Despite the variety, informal workers can be 
classified into two broad groups by their employment status: self-employed workers who 
operating small unregistered businesses; wage workers who work in insecure and 
unprotected jobs (Chen, 2005).  
 According to the definition by the NSO, informal employment refers to employed 
persons who are not covered by social security and receive no protection and benefits 
from their employers. Following this definition, we use medical service welfare from 
employers as an indicator of formality. 4  The respondent who reports receiving 
government/state enterprise’s welfare or social security’s medical card is classified as a 
formal worker, while that receiving other types of medical welfare is classified as an 
informal worker.  
 
2.2.3 Estimation of Earnings  
The focus of this study is to generate an age-earnings profile of workers in different 
employment sectors: formal and informal. All sources of earnings from work, both wage 
and non-wage incomes, are used to estimate workers’ average annual earnings.5 The data 
 
4 We use question 18 in Part 1 of HSES Questionnaire of Household Members and Expenditures. Household 
members who receive either government/state enterprise’s welfare or social security’s medical card are 
considered as workers in the formal sector.  
5 The incomes include labor income, both wage and non-wage, but not include non-labor income, such as 




reported by the HSES is in Thai baht and nominal terms. Consumer price indices (CPI) 
based on the year 2015 published by the Thai Bureau of Trade and Economics are used 
to convert nominal earnings into real values. The earnings of each worker are calculated 
based on their work status as described below:  
Employees: It covers government employees and private employees. Earnings of 
wage workers are directly determined by their total annual income, including 
wages/salaries, overtime, bonuses, and welfare received from employers.6  
Self-employed workers: It covers employers and own-account workers. There are 
two sources of earnings for this type of workers: income from farm and non-farm 
businesses. Earnings are determined based on the occupation reported as a primary job. 
If the occupation is reported as skilled agricultural, forestry, and fishery, income from 
farm business is used to calculate annual earnings. For other types of occupations, income 
from non-farm business is used. Annual earnings are defined as gross income from 
business minus expenditure.7 Earnings of self-employed workers are difficult to separate 
capital income and labor income. Thus, our estimation of earnings for self-employed 
workers could be overestimated. However, even we may include capital income, their 
income level are still much lower than formal workers. So, our estimate could be the 
upper bound for informal workers. 
 
 
6 Total earnings of wage workers = IW12+IW13+IW14 
7 Annual earnings for farm business are defined as gross receipts (IA08+IA09+IA11+(IA15-IA19)+IA20) 
minus expenditure (IA25+IA26+IA13+IA17+IA22), according to the NSO calculation. Annual earnings 
for non-farm business are gross money receipts from business (IB08) minus total operating cost (IB09), 




Contributing family workers: We use a strategy similar to Dasgupta et al. (2015) 
to impute earnings for self-employed workers. Total annual earnings of household 
business with contributing family workers are equally distributed between contributing 
family workers and the owners.8  
We drop workers who are members of cooperative group and select only samples 
with positive earnings. We exclude the highest one percent quantile of annual earnings to 
remove an exceptional outlier from the sample resulting 147,619 observations.  
 
2.2.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics of all samples and of samples in each sector are summarized in 
Tables 2.1. Approximately 71% of all samples are employed in the informal sector. 
Regarding the educational level, the majority of informal workers are high school 
dropouts (84.68%), while formal workers are at least high school graduates (55.23%). In 
terms of employment status, most of the informal workers are self-employed (73%), while 
formal workers are mostly employees (89.63%).  
An alternative measure to define formality is employment status. Informal 
workers include small business owners, own-account workers, and contributing family 
workers. All others are classified as formal workers. We drop members of cooperative 
group from our sample as they account for only 0.01% of the total sample. Top 5% earners 
of employers are excluded because they might be employers in the formal sector whose 
earnings are usually exceptionally high. We also drop the bottom 40% of private 
employees who are likely employed by informal small businesses from our sample. 
 




Characteristics of workers by sector classified by employment status are presented in 
Table 2.2. The results show the similar pattern as in Table 2.1 that almost 70% of workers 
are employed in the informal sector. In terms of educational level, 84.14% of informal 
workers are high school dropouts while 52.7% of formal workers are at least high school 
graduates.   
Figure 2.1 presents a comparison of average real annual earnings between formal 
and informal workers over the life cycle. It plots the average earnings within age bins of 
workers in each sector. This preliminary pattern of life cycle earnings profile reveals 
while average real earnings of workers in the formal sector increase significantly with 
age, earnings of informal workers show a flatter pattern along the life cycle.  
Individuals with different completed education degrees earn differently. Previous 
studies show that workers with a higher education level would have higher earnings than 
those with a lower education level (Mincer, 1974). In this study, individuals are classified 
into either high school dropouts or high school graduates according to their latest 
education attainment level, as reported in the HSES. Figure 2.2 plots the average real 
annual earnings of workers in the formal and informal sectors by the level of education 
attained. For both formal and informal sectors, workers who, at least, are high school 
graduates have higher earnings than those without a high school degree. However, given 
the same level of education, formally employed workers have higher earnings than their 
counterparts in the informal sector.  
Figure 2.3 shows the patterns of the age-earnings profile by sector from different 
cohorts. A cohort is denoted by the birth year of each individual. Then, they are grouped 
into a 10-year cohort bin (for example, individuals born during 1950–1959 belong to 




enter the labor market at the same time. Life cycle earnings profiles of the informal 
workers are flatter relative to the formal workers within the same cohort bin. The average 
earnings has increased for more recent cohorts for both types of workers.  
 
2.2.5 Empirical Analysis 
From the cross-sectional evidence on life cycle earnings profiles presented earlier, we ask 
whether the difference in the sector of employment can explain the difference in earnings 
patterns. We develop the model by using the following regression model: 
𝑙𝑛⁡(𝐸𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2ℎ𝑖,𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑠𝑖,𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖,𝑡      
             +𝛽6𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖,𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖,𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑀𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝛾 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡,          (2.1) 
where 𝐸𝑖𝑡  is real annual earnings of individual i, who conducted the survey at time t,⁡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 
is the current age in years at the time when the survey was conducted, 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is a sector 
dummy which equal to one if individual works in the formal sector and zero otherwise, 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖,𝑡 is an education dummy which equal to one if the individual has an education level 
of high school or above and zero otherwise, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡  comprises other covariates including 
cohort (birth year of the interviewed individual) and location, and 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 is the residual of 
the logarithm of earnings. 𝑀𝑡 is the unemployment rate to capture the macroeconomic 
effects in a specific survey year. The quadratic in age ℎ𝑖𝑡
2  allows for the effect of age on 
earnings at a decreasing rate. The interaction terms of the linear age allow different sectors 
and education levels to have different slopes of the earning profiles indicating the growth 
of earning over the life cycle.  
Pooled ordinary least squares regression is performed by using the sample from 




to zero. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 present the age-earnings profiles from the estimated values 
of the logarithm of annual earnings by using coefficients from the regression equation 
(2.1) compared to the data. Table 2.3 summarizes estimation results. We find informal 
workers at a disadvantage. Coefficients on the formal sector dummy are significantly 
positive, indicating that earnings level of formal workers is higher than informal workers. 
This result is consistent with the literature on earnings differential between formal and 
informal employment. Our results show that earnings level of higher educated formal 
workers can be approximately 67% larger than that of lower educated informal workers. 
Moreover, the coefficient on the interaction of linear age and formal sector dummy is 
statistically positive, explaining higher earnings growth in the formal sector.  
Moreover, on exploring effects of education on earnings growth we find that 
workers with higher education have higher earnings, both in terms of level and growth 
than workers with lower education. The coefficient of the interaction between education 
and sector is also significantly positive, which creates a large earnings gap between 
higher-educated workers in different sectors.   
Our results show that higher-educated formal workers have the highest average 
earnings growth over 30 years of working at 4.1%, whereas informal workers with low 
education have the lowest average earnings growth at 0.8%. Even less-educated formal 
workers have higher average earnings growth than informal workers with higher 
education—2.9% and 1.9% growth, respectively. Given the highest average earnings 
growth of 4.1%, this figure is much lower than average earnings growth in the US, 






2.3 Earnings Uncertainties 
This section investigates uninsured idiosyncratic shocks to earnings in the two 
employment sectors. Although the age-earning profile provides insights on how earnings 
change with age, a residual deviates earnings from the earning profiles. This residual is 
the earnings shock or uncertainty that individuals face over time.  
In this study, we assume that the earnings shock follows a functional form and 
constitutes three components: an individual-specific fixed effect, a persistent component, 
which follows an AR(1) process, and a transitory component. There are two main features 
in this study. First, all three components of the shocks are different between the two 
sectors. We assume that individuals remain in the same sector during their working life. 
Second, there are two specifications for the earnings process: age-invariant and age-
dependent processes. In an age-invariant earnings process, the coefficient of the persistent 
component and variance of transitory and persistent shocks are constant over the life cycle, 
which is often used in the literature. However, according to Karahan and Ozkan (2013), 
workers at different ages face different earnings shocks. Thus, we also allow the persistent 
parameter and variance of shocks to vary by age group following an age-dependent 
earnings process. 
 
2.3.1 Data Selection and Construction 
To study how earnings vary with age due to uncertainties, panel data is required to 
construct the variance-covariance matrix between different ages of residuals earnings to 
estimate earnings shocks. Although the HSES data provides rich detail of workers’ 




from Townsend Thai Household Annual Resurvey, between 2008 and 2015 which 
provide information on both urban and rural areas, for this analysis. The survey is 
conducted on an annual basis and contains information on the earnings of households as 
well as their socio-economic characteristics.  
The sample is restricted to males aged 30–59, who are in the labor force, have 
positive earnings, and are present in at least four consecutive years of the survey. 
Estimation of average annual earnings follows the same procedure as the HSES data. 
Earnings of each worker are calculated based on his work status.10 Total earnings are 
converted to real earnings by using the CPI deflator based on the year 2015. The top 10% 
of employers and the bottom 10% of private employees are dropped from the sample. 
Following these criteria leaves an unbalanced panel of 477 and 1,118 individuals in the 
formal and informal sectors, respectively. Therefore, the total sample consists of 1,595 
individuals and 9,734 observations.  
To define formality, it is difficult to classify by social protection as Townsend’s 
panel data does not provide such information. However, each household member reported 
their employment status. Therefore, we use this definition to indicate the formality of 
each laborer. This study assumes that workers who report their work status as the owner 
of a business, contributing family worker, and employee earning piece rate or daily wage 
are classified as workers in the informal sector, whereas employees with monthly wages 
and government workers are defined as formal workers. By applying this assumption, the 
 
10 We use daily wage variable (oc1c) to calculate earnings for wage earners and as a proxy to identify the 
number of self-employed workers (owners of business, unpaid family members, and employees who earn 
piece rate) in the household.  
Total earnings of monthly wage worker = oc1c*12 
Total earnings of daily wage worker = oc1c*12*20 





proportions of formal and informal workers in the data set are approximately 21.5% and 
78.5% of total employment, respectively.11 Table 2.4 presents descriptive statistics of all 
samples and by sector. The majority of formal workers are at least high school graduates 
(65.8%), while the education level of informal workers is mostly lower than the high 
school level (79.35%).  
 
2.3.2 Age-Invariant Earnings Process  
We begin with the age-invariant earnings process, in which all shock parameters are 
constant over time. We extract the residual earnings from the Townsend panel data by 
following the estimation in the previous section. The residual earnings are decomposed 
into a fixed effect, an AR(1) component, and a transitory component. We follow the 
method used in Storesletten et al. (2004) for an age-invariant earnings process. A time-
series process for 𝑢𝑖ℎ is specified as follows: 
𝑢𝑖,ℎ
𝑠 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑧𝑖,ℎ
𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,ℎ




𝑠 ,                  (2.3) 
where⁡𝛼𝑖~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝛼
2), 𝜀𝑖,ℎ
𝑠 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀,𝑠
2 ), 𝜂𝑖,ℎ
𝑠 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜂,𝑠
2 ),  𝑧𝑖,0
𝑠 = 0 and 𝐸(𝑢𝑖,ℎ
𝑠 ) = 0 in the 
cross-section for all ages. 𝛼𝑖⁡ is an individual-specific fixed effect, determined at the 
beginning of the life cycle and is the same for all individuals in both sectors. The terms 
𝑧𝑖,ℎ
𝑠  and 𝜀𝑖,ℎ
𝑠  are persistent and transitory shocks of earnings, respectively, at age h of 
individual i employed in sector s, realized at each period over the life cycle. The transitory 
shock includes measurement error and temporary changes in earnings such as bonuses 
 
11  The possibility of informal workers being over-represented in the data set is a limitation of using 




and overtime payment. The persistent shock captures lasting changes in earnings, such as 
promotions and health status. Each individual faces a persistent shock of size 𝜂𝑖,ℎ
𝑠 , 
governed by the variance 𝜎𝜂,𝑠
2 . The persistent coefficient 𝜌𝑠  determines the extent to 
which the shock lasts. 
 To estimate all parameters, we employ a minimum distance estimator method that 
minimizes the distance between the theoretical variance-covariance structure of residual 
earnings and their empirical counterparts. The variance-covariance matrix between 
different ages of the residual earnings is constructed from Townsend’s panel data. We 
restrict to individuals who appear in the survey for at least four consecutive survey years 
and have never switched their sector of employment. 12  The theoretical variance-
covariance structure of the idiosyncratic shocks is given by:  
 




































2                   (2.7) 
 
12 According to Townsend’s panel data, the sector transition matrix shows that 96.38% of workers in the 
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The estimation results are presented in panel (A) of Table 2.5. The first column is 
the variance of a fixed effect, 0.0429, which is the same for both sectors. The left panel 
reports all parameters of the formal sector, and the right panel represents the informal 
sector. We find that the persistent coefficients for the formal and informal sectors are 
0.9842 and 0.7789, respectively. The estimation results indicate that earnings shocks in 
the formal sector are more persistent than in the informal sector. Formal workers tend to 
take a longer time to recover from an unexpected shock. However, the variances of 
persistence and transitory shocks are higher in the informal sector than the formal sector, 
indicating that the size of the shock is greater in the informal sector. The variances of 
persistence and transitory shocks are 0.0105 and 0.0421 for the formal sector, and 0.0947 
and 0.1579 for the informal sector, respectively.  
 
2.3.3 Age-Dependent Earnings Process 
For an age-dependent earnings process, we follow the method used in Karahan and Ozkan 
(2013). However, our sample size is too small to estimate the age-profile of these 
parameters precisely. Therefore, we use age groups instead of age for our analysis. Each 
individual is classified into three age groups (g): 30–40, 40–50, and 50–59. We follow 




variance of persistent shock, the variance of transitory shock as well as the persistent 
coefficient to be different between different age groups.  
Panel (B) of Table 2.5 shows results from the age-dependent earnings process. The 
variance of the fixed effect is 0.0571. The persistent coefficient shows a different pattern 
with age group between the formal and informal sectors. For the first two age groups, 
persistent coefficients for both sectors are quite flat and slightly decrease for both sectors. 
Although the persistent coefficient for the last age group continues to decrease for the 
formal sector, it increases for the informal sector. As the age group increases, persistent 
shocks for the formal sector decrease from 0.9643 to 0.9286 and 0.6429, while the 
persistent coefficients for the informal sector are 0.6071, 0.5814, and 0.7500. Workers in 
the formal sector experience higher persistent earnings shock early in working life, and it 
becomes moderately persistent after age 50. On the other hand, shocks in the informal 
sector are moderately persistent over time.  
Moreover, variances of persistent shocks are higher in the informal sector except 
for the last age groups. Variances for age groups 30–40, 40–50, and 50–59, are 0.0102, 
0.0207, and 0.1814 for the formal sector and 0.2047, 0.2389, and 0.0861 for the informal 
sector, respectively.  
The variance of transitory shocks increases with age for the informal sector, but 
the size is more significant in the informal sector than the formal sector. For the formal 
sector, it increases from 0.0278 to 0.1107 and decreases to 0.0547. For the informal sector, 







2.3.4 Assessment of the Estimation Results 
We compare theoretical variances of residual earnings from the two earning 
specifications with their empirical counterparts. Equation (2.6) presents theoretical 
variances. For 𝜌 < 1, the residual inequality will converge to a well-defined limit in a 
concave fashion as the summation term converges to 𝜎𝜂
2/(1 − 𝜌2). If 𝜌 = 1, the variance 
profile will be linear. Empirical variances of residual earnings in Figure 2.6 are from 
Townsend’s panel data, implying that targeting these moments would result in a different 
𝜌 between the two sectors. The formal sector should have a higher 𝜌 as the degree of 
concavity of its variance profile is less than the informal sector.    
Figure 2.6 shows the profile of the variance of residual earnings from the age-
invariant process by sector of employment. The variances increase steadily for the formal 
sector. On the contrary, the variances for the informal sector increase until age 35 and 
become stable after that.  
Figure 2.6 also presents the variance profile from the age-dependent earnings 
process. Although the model can capture the patterns of the variance profile for each 
sector, the estimates of the variance from the model are higher than their empirical 
counterparts.  
Our results from age-invariant and age-dependent earnings processes can replicate 
the pattern of age-profiles of residual inequality for both sectors. The age-invariant 
process performs better in capturing both the pattern and level of variance profiles. There 
are two limitations to the age-dependent specification. First, the sample size is very small, 
especially when we group them into age groups. Second, we cannot select parameters 
without constraints to only eligible values due to computational limitation while the 





This chapter examines earnings profiles and uncertainties over the life cycle in developing 
economies with the existence of the informal sector. First, our results show that the impact 
of the sectors is statistically significant. Earnings of formal workers are found 
significantly greater than informal workers, in line with the literature on formal/informal 
earnings differential. Moreover, our study contributes to the literature on life cycle 
earnings, considering sector effects on earnings. We find that the growth rate of earnings 
is higher in the formal sector. In terms of level of education, formal workers are better-
off than informal workers. Higher-educated formal workers have the highest average 
earnings growth. Even formal workers with lower education can have higher average 
earnings growth than informal workers with higher education.  
 Second, this study contributes to the literature on estimating the idiosyncratic 
earnings shocks for two aspects: sectors and age groups. We find persistent coefficients 
in both sectors less than unity and the shocks more persistent in the formal sector. 
However, their variances are higher in the informal sector, indicating that the magnitude 
of the shocks is more substantial in the informal sector than in the formal sector. When 
we allow different age groups to have different shocks, our results show that persistence 
declines with age in the formal sector while slightly increases with age in the informal 
sector. This pattern is different from Karahan and Ozkan (2013), where the persistent 




2.A Tables  
Table 2.1 Characteristics of Workers by Sector  






Education (%)    
   Lower than high school 73.09 44.77 84.68 
   High school graduate 11.09 18.35 8.12 
   Vocational education 4.78 11.00 2.24 
   College and above 11.04 25.88 4.96 
Work Status (%)    
   Employer 9.14 2.43 11.88 
   Own-account worker 44.24 7.66 59.21 
   Contributing family worker 1.22 0.28 1.61 
   Government employee 13.03 36.39 3.48 
   Private employee 32.37 53.24 23.82 
Earnings (in 2015 Thai Baht)    
   P25           47,321         118,989            34,014  
   P50           95,905         198,833            68,384  
   P75        186,449         327,592         118,328  
Source: Author’s estimation is based on the HSES data from 2002 to 2017, NSO. 
 
Table 2.2 Characteristics of Workers by Sector (Employment Measure) 






Education (%)   
   Lower than high school 47.3 84.14 
   High school graduate 17.99 8.28 
   Vocational education 9.83 2.66 
   College and above 24.88 4.92 
Earnings (in 2015 Thai Baht)   
   P25        120,564            28,701  
   P50        189,206            64,921  
   P75        319,835         129,311  
Source: Author’s estimation is based on the HSES data from 2002 to 2017 which the top 





Table 2.3 Estimation Results of Age-earnings Profile 
Variable ln Earnings  
Age (ℎ𝑖,𝑡) 0.0349*** (0.003) 
Age Squared (ℎ𝑖,𝑡
2 ) -0.0009*** (0.000) 
Formal sector dummy (𝑠𝑖,𝑡) 0.1556*** (0.015) 
Formal*Age (𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ ℎ𝑖,𝑡) 0.0205*** (0.001) 
High education dummy (𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖,𝑡) 0.2677*** (0.017) 
High education*Age  (𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖,𝑡 ∗ ℎ𝑖,𝑡) 0.0090*** (0.001) 
High education*Formal 0.2423*** (0.015) 
Cohort 0.0265*** (0.002) 
Region   
  Central (Excluding Bangkok Metropolis) 0.0000 (.) 
  Bangkok Metropolis 0.3899*** (0.009) 
  North -0.5089*** (0.009) 
  Northeast -0.7718*** (0.010) 
  South -0.0497*** (0.009) 
Public Sector  0.4964*** (0.011) 
Unemployment rate -0.0827*** (0.022) 
Intercept 10.4811*** (0.092) 
N 147619  
Source: Author’s estimation is based on the HSES data from 2002 to 2017, NSO. 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 





Table 2.4 Descriptive Statistics from Townsend’s Panel Data (cross-sectional) 
 






Education (%)    
   Lower than high school 69.87 35.2 79.35 
   High school graduate 12.05 19.32 10.06 
   Vocational education 8.89 17.65 6.49 
   College and above 9.19 27.83 4.1 
Earnings (in Thai Baht)    
   P25           54,707         108,487            49,931  
   P50           87,364         153,061            72,705  
   P75        147,843         237,836         120,049  
Source: Author’s estimation is based on Townsend’s panel data from 2008 to 2015 which 








Formal  Informal 
𝜌 𝜎𝜀
2 𝜎𝜂
2  𝜌 𝜎𝜀
2 𝜎𝜂
2 
(A) Age-invariant 0.0429 0.9842 0.0421 0.0105  0.7789 0.1579 0.0947 
(B) Age Group         
30–40 0.0571 0.9643 0.0278 0.0102  0.6071 0.1791 0.2047 
40–50 0.0571 0.9286 0.1107 0.0207  0.5714 0.1911 0.2389 
50–59 0.0571 0.6429 0.0547 0.1814  0.7500 0.3122 0.0861 







Figure 2.1 Average Real Annual Earnings of Workers by Sector, Raw data 
 
  



















































Sector Switching Transition Matrix by Age Group 




Informal   
30-39 93.34 6.66 
40-49 96.44 3.56 
50-59 97.85 2.15 
All 96.38 3.62 
Formal 
  
30-39 10.46 89.54 
40-49 12.35 87.65 
50-59 9.76 90.24 
All 10.80 89.20 








In this section, we try to estimate the labor earnings by considering the alternative setting 
of education. In the original setting, the education dummy equals one if an individual has 
an education level of high school or above. However, this ‘high education’ group in the 
formal sector could include a greater fraction of college graduates than in the informal 
sector. Therefore, we redefine education dummy (edu) to edu1 and edu2 where edu1 
equals to one if the individual has an education level of high school or vocational and 
zero otherwise, and edu2 equals to one if the individual has an education level of college 
and above and zero otherwise.  
The results of the estimate are presented in Table A2.2. The coefficient on edu1 
is higher than that of edu2, indicating that the level of earnings of high school or 
vocational graduates is considerably higher than college graduates. However, the 
coefficient on the interaction terms edu2*Formal is significantly higher than 
edu1*Formal, meaning that the earnings of workers with a college degree are significantly 
higher than high school and vocational graduates if they are employed in the formal sector. 
Our results can be implied that education levels have less impact on earnings than sector 
of employment.  
In terms of average earnings growth over 30 years of working, the average growth 
rates of workers in the formal sector are higher than workers in the informal sector at all 
education levels. The average growth rates for high school dropouts, high school and 
vocational graduates, and college graduates are 3.3%, 3.9%, and 3.9% in the informal 





Moreover, we also run separate regressions by education levels (less than high 
school, high school and vocational, and college and above) according to the following 
regression equation: 
 ln⁡(𝐸𝑖,𝑡













𝑒 𝛾𝑒 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡
𝑒   (2.9) 
The results are shown in Table A2.3. The coefficients on sector dummy are 
significantly positive for all educational levels and are higher for higher education levels. 
This result is consistent with our previous result that workers with higher education level 
who are employed in the formal sector have higher earnings than in the informal sector.  
In terms of average earnings growth over 30 years of working, formal workers 
who are college graduates have the highest average earnings growth, 5.6%, whereas the 
average earnings growth of formal workers who are high school dropouts and high school 
or vocational graduates are 2.6% and 2.7%, respectively. For workers in the informal 
sector, their average earnings growth is much smaller than their counterparts in the formal 
sector. The average earnings growths for high school dropouts, high school or vocational 
graduates, and college graduates are 1.4%, 0.8%, and 0.6%, respectively.  








Table A2.2 Estimation Results of Age-earnings Profile (Redefined Education Dummy) 
Variable ln Earnings  
Age  0.0346*** (0.003) 
Age Squared  -0.0009*** (0.000) 
Formal sector dummy  0.1877*** (0.015) 
Formal*Age 0.0193*** (0.001) 
High school and vocational dummy (edu1) 0.3850*** (0.019) 
High school and vocational dummy*Age  0.0066*** (0.001) 
High school and vocational dummy *Formal -0.0466** (0.016) 
College and above dummy (edu2) 0.0748** (0.028) 
College and above dummy*Age  0.0100*** (0.001) 
College and above dummy *Formal 0.6818*** (0.025) 
Cohort 0.0261*** (0.002) 
Region   
  Central  0.0000 (.) 
  Bangkok Metropolis 0.3752*** (0.009) 
  North -0.5092*** (0.009) 
  Northeast -0.7825*** (0.010) 
  South -0.0565*** (0.009) 
Public Sector  0.4307*** (0.011) 
Unemployment rate -0.0881*** (0.022) 
Intercept 10.5032*** (0.091) 
N 147619  
Source: Author’s estimation is based on the HSES data from 2002 to 2017, NSO. 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 


















Age  0.0402*** (0.003) 0.0260*** (0.005) 0.0319*** (0.007) 
Age Squared  -0.0009*** (0.000) -0.0006*** (0.000) -0.0009*** (0.000) 
Formal sector dummy  0.2399*** (0.017) 0.2624*** (0.026) 0.3781*** (0.041) 
Formal*Age  0.0129*** (0.001) 0.0191*** (0.002) 0.0519*** (0.003) 
Cohort 0.0300*** (0.002) 0.0152*** (0.003) 0.0350*** (0.005) 
Region       
  Central  0.0000 (.) 0.0000 (.) 0.0000 (.) 
  Bangkok Metropolis 0.3899*** (0.009) 0.2267*** (0.017) 0.3373*** (0.024) 
  North -0.5089*** (0.009) -0.3949*** (0.021) -0.6832*** (0.027) 
  Northeast -0.7718*** (0.010) -0.5415*** (0.022) -0.2550*** (0.028) 
  South -0.0497*** (0.009) -0.1590*** (0.018) -0.1152*** (0.025) 
Public Sector  0.4964*** (0.011) 0.2082*** (0.017) 0.2990*** (0.024) 
Unemployment rate -0.0827*** (0.022) 0.0369 (0.040) 0.2468*** (0.052) 
Intercept 10.4811*** (0.092) 11.1320*** (0.164) 10.2507*** (0.222) 
N 99873  26595  21151  
Source: Author’s estimation is based on the HSES data from 2002 to 2017, NSO. 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 









Uncertainties and Inequality  
in Developing Economies: A Structural Analysis 
and Policy Implications 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Understanding the dynamic of economic inequality and its determinants is important for 
various research studies in economics, such as education policy and economic growth. In 
the literature, inequality has been associated with income, wealth, consumption, and a 
variety of individual-specific characteristics such as educational level. However, most of 
the existing work is concentrated in developed countries, and the studies in developing 
countries are still very limited.  
 The fact from literature shows that inequality increases as individuals age. Deaton 
and Paxson (1994) investigate the consumption and income inequality within the same 
cohort across three different countries, namely, the US, UK, and Taiwan. They find that 
the within-cohort inequality increases with age. More recent studies show that the 
increase in inequality is due to persistent idiosyncratic earnings shocks. For example, 
Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) examines why earnings and consumption 
inequality increase with age and find that individual-specific earnings shocks can explain 
the increasing pattern. Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) propose that changes in 





Therefore, this chapter aims to fill the gap in the literature by focusing on how 
inequality in consumption and earnings changes with age in developing countries and 
investigate if the change can be explained by the existence of uninsurable idiosyncratic 
earnings shocks. We use Thailand as a representative for calibration and quantitative 
analysis. Thailand is a large economy, with around 55% of workers employed informally. 
The social security system already exists, but its coverage is limited to workers in the 
formal sector.  
For this purpose, we first develop a life cycle model with heterogeneous agents 
facing mortality, earnings, and employment uncertainties. The key innovation in our 
model is that there are two sectors of employment in the economy, that is, the formal and 
informal sectors. During working age, workers in different sectors face different earnings 
shocks and can move between the two sectors. After retirement, all agents receive an age-
specific old-age allowance from the government. Our results show that the model can 
capture the increasing pattern of earnings and consumption inequality, but the level of 
consumption inequality is approximately 42% too high, relative to the data.  
Storesletten et al. (2004) find that the divergence of consumption inequality 
between theory and data is due to the availability of insurance arrangements to actual 
agents that are not present in the model. By incorporating social security, the model can 
reduce consumption inequality and provide a better account of the data. Blundell, Graber, 
and Mogstad (2015) study income dynamics and the impact of insurance mechanisms to 
labor income shocks in Norway. They suggest that the tax-transfer system can reduce 
both permanent and transitory income shocks encountered by individuals. De Nardi, Fella, 
and Paz-Pardo (2019) study earnings dynamics and examine the extent to which earnings 





Following the literature, we extend our model to incorporate two mechanisms of 
insurance arrangement to earnings shocks, namely, old-age employment and social 
security system. In developing countries, older people are more vulnerable to poverty. 
Without social insurance, they have to depend on their labor earnings for daily life. 
Furthermore, the social security system is a formal insurance arrangement for old age, in 
the form of pensions. Therefore, we include these two features to our model. In an old-
age employment setting, we allow elderly agents to work after their retirement age within 
the same sector but face retirement risk at every age. Further, we introduce a social 
security into the old-age employment model according to which only formal workers can 
receive a pension after retirement. Our finding shows that incorporating these two 
mechanisms can reduce consumption inequality. The model with social security provides 
a good account of the data and we use this extended model as a benchmark for policy 
experiments.  
We further examine the effect of different social insurance programs on inequality 
as well as consumption and saving behaviors. We use the model with old-age employment 
and social security to conduct two policy experiments. First, we investigate the effect of 
a social welfare system by varying the amount of subsidy provided by the government to 
guarantee the minimum consumption floor. We find that a high level of social welfare 
cannot reduce consumption inequality significantly, except those very young and very 
old. Second, we extend the social security system to cover the informal sector. In this 
experiment, all agents are qualified for a pension after the retirement age. Our results 
show that the extension of pension can reduce consumption inequality significantly 





The remaining contents of this chapter include: Section 2 describes the 
construction of earnings and consumption inequality profiles; Section 3 outlines and 
parameterizes the basic model; Section 4 analyzes the extension of the model; Section 5 
discusses policy experiments, and Section 6 provides the conclusion. 
 
3.2 Inequality over the Life Cycle 
We use the data from the Household Socio-Economic Survey (HSES) to estimate 
earnings and consumption inequality profiles.13 We define consumption by using the 
household average monthly consumption expenditure, which includes expenditures on 
nondurable goods (food, clothes, and utilities) as well as durable goods (housing and 
vehicles). Both consumption and earnings are converted into real values using consumer 
price indices (CPI) of the year 2015 published by the Thai Bureau of Trade and 
Economics.  
 To construct earnings and consumption inequality profiles, we compute the 
variances of the logarithm of earnings and consumption, which are decomposed into two 
parts. The first part is the variance from the difference in observable individual 
characteristics that is obtained from a regression on age, sector of employment, and 
educational level that rule out cohort and location effects. The second part is the variance 
from shocks that cannot be explained by the aforementioned observable characteristics, 
which is the residual from the regression.  
Figure 3.1 reports the cross-sectional variance of the logarithm of earnings and 
consumption by age from the HSES data. There are two important features of these 
 





findings. First, both earnings and consumption inequality increase over the working 
period. Second, earnings inequality increases faster with age than consumption inequality. 
Figure 3.2 exhibits the inequality profiles of the formal and informal sectors. The lifetime 
profiles of inequality are different between the formal and informal sector. Although 
earnings and consumption inequality in both sectors increase with age, the increase is 
faster in the formal sector.  
 
3.3 Basic Model 
We develop a stochastic life cycle model of workers in developing countries with the 
existence of a large informal sector to study the impact of earnings shocks on 
consumption and saving behaviors. Each individual lives for a finite period and makes 
optimal decisions on consumption (c) and savings (𝑎′). In every period, individuals face 
employment uncertainties that determine their sector of employment and earnings. In 
addition, they have to face life-expectancy shocks, which define the length of their lives.  
 
3.3.1 Demographics 
The economy is populated by ex-ante heterogeneous individuals in terms of education 
who live up to a maximum age of H. Agents engage in labor market activity before they 
reach age ℎ = 𝐻𝑟 , where 𝐻𝑟 is retirement age. An individual with age h can survive to 








3.3.2 Employment and Income Uncertainties  
Individuals enter the labor market at age 25 in a specific employment sector, either formal 
or informal sector, and retire at age 60. At every stage along the life cycle, they face 
employment and income uncertainties.  
At the beginning of every period, agents receive an employment shock that 
determines their employment status, 𝑠 ∈ {1, 2, 3}. An agent with s = 1 or 2 can work in 
the formal sector or the informal sector, whereas an agent with s = 3 does not work. 
Agents are allowed to change their employment status in the next period. The probability 
of being employed in the next period depends on age, educational level, and current 
employment status. The level of educational attainment, which can be either low or 
high, ⁡𝑒𝑑𝑢 ∈ {𝑙, ℎ} , is exogenously determined before the start of the economy and 
remains throughout the life cycle. Thus, the age-dependent transition probability of 
employment is given by the 3 × 3 matrix 𝑃𝑠
ℎ,𝑒𝑑𝑢(𝑠′|𝑠). 
Before retirement, individual labor earnings are determined using the following 
process: 
𝑙𝑛⁡(𝐸𝑖,𝑡) = 𝑓(ℎ, 𝑠, 𝑒𝑑𝑢) +⁡𝛼𝑖 ⁡+ ⁡𝑧𝑖,ℎ
𝑠 ⁡+ ⁡𝜀𝑖,ℎ
𝑠 ,             (3.1) 
𝑓(ℎ, 𝑠, 𝑒𝑑𝑢) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1ℎ𝑖,ℎ +𝛽2ℎ𝑖,ℎ
2 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑖,ℎ +𝛽4𝑠𝑖,ℎℎ𝑖,ℎ + 𝛽5𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖   
             ⁡⁡⁡⁡+𝛽6𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖ℎ𝑖,ℎ + 𝛽7𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖,ℎ ,⁡      (3.2) 
where 𝑓(ℎ, 𝑠, 𝑒𝑑𝑢) is the average age-earnings profile conditioning on age (h), sector of 
employment (s), and educational attainment (edu). The coefficients 𝛽0 − 𝛽7  are the 
estimates in the previous chapter. 𝛼𝑖~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝛼






𝑠 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀,𝑠
2 ) is the transitory shock that is received every period. 𝑧𝑖,ℎ
𝑠  is the 
persistent shock that is also received every period and follows an AR(1) process: 
 𝑧𝑖,ℎ
𝑠 ⁡= ⁡ 𝜌𝑠𝑧𝑖,ℎ−1
𝑠 ⁡+ ⁡𝜂𝑖,ℎ
𝑠 ;  𝜂𝑖,ℎ
𝑠 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜂,𝑠
2 ), 𝑧𝑖,0 ⁡= ⁡0.     (3.3) 
Workers who remain in the same sector receive earnings shocks from the AR(1) process. 
For those who move to a different sector, we assume that they have zero persistence. Thus, 
their earnings shocks do not follow the AR(1) process. After retirement, all agents receive 
an old-age transfer from the government according to their age and face no risk. 
 
3.3.3 Preferences  
Agents make a decision on consumption and savings to maximize their expected utility. 








where 𝛽⁡is the discount rate and 𝑐𝑖,ℎ represent an individual’s consumption at age h. We 






3.3.4 Individual’s Problem 
Let 𝑉ℎ  denote the value function of an agent at age h. The state of each individual in age 








 𝑉(𝑥) = max
𝑐, 𝑎′
{𝑈(𝑐𝑖,ℎ) + 𝛽𝜓ℎ𝐸𝑉(𝑥
′)}      (3.6) 
subject to the following constraints:  
𝑐 + 𝑎′ = (1 + 𝑟)𝑎 + 𝐸 + 𝑡𝑟ℎ≥𝐻𝑟 + 𝑇,     (3.7) 
 𝐸 = {
𝑒𝑓(ℎ, 𝑠,𝑒𝑑𝑢)+𝛼+𝑧+𝜀                   𝑖𝑓 ℎ < 𝐻𝑟
0                                               𝑖𝑓 ℎ ≥ 𝐻𝑟
 ,    (3.8) 
 𝑧 = 𝜌𝑠𝑧−1 + 𝜂; 𝑧0 = 0,      (3.9) 
 𝛼~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝛼
2), 𝜀~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀,𝑠
2 ),  𝜂~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜂,𝑠
2 ),     (3.10) 
𝑇 = max{0,  𝑐 − [(1 + 𝑟)𝑎 + 𝐸 + 𝑡𝑟ℎ≥𝐻𝑟]},     (3.11) 
 𝑎 ≥ 0; 𝑐 ≥ 0,         (3.12) 
where 𝐸𝑉(𝑥′) is the expected value from the next period with respect to employment and 
earnings uncertainties, 𝑎𝑖,ℎ  denotes asset holdings, 𝑓(ℎ, 𝑠, 𝑒𝑑𝑢) is the earnings profile, 
𝛼  is the fixed effect, 𝑧  is the persistent shock, 𝜀  is the transitory shock, 𝑡𝑟ℎ≥𝐻𝑅  is the 
age-specific old-age transfer for retired agents, 𝑐 is the minimum consumption level, and 
T is the transfer to ensure a minimum consumption.  
 
3.3.5 Data, Estimation, and Calibration 
Table 3.1 summarizes all parameters used in this section. The model period is equivalent 
to one year of calendar time. Agents enter the economy at age 25, retire at age 60, and are 
dead at age 80. The survival probabilities 𝜓ℎ are taken from the United Nations life tables. 
The rate-of-return on capital (r) is set to 1.58% according to the weighted average deposit 
interest rate of commercial banks from 2000–2017. 14  The social welfare system is 
 
14 The rate-of-return on capital is the average of the weighted average deposit interest rate of commercial 






available to ensure the minimum consumption level that is denoted by 𝑐 . We set the 
amount of 𝑐 to equal 5% of average earnings.15  
The risk aversion coefficient, 𝜇, and discount factor,⁡𝛽, are chosen at the same 
time to match the wealth-to-income ratio (aggregate and by education level). The wealth-
to-income ratio is calculated from the HSES data. We select only male household heads 
aged 30–59 who are working and have a positive income and exclude the higher one 
percent wealth quantile.16 The aggregate wealth-to-income ratio is 3.64. We also match 
the wealth-to-income ratio by education levels, which are 3.10 for high education and 
4.19 for low education. We constrain the range of 𝜇 to (1–9) and 𝛽 to (0–1), and set 𝜇 =
3 and 𝛽 = 0.960, which is within the range commonly used in the literature.  
The transition probabilities of employment status are determined by using the 
panel data from Townsend’s household survey (2008–2015). We select only male 
household members aged 30–59.17 The sample is categorized into three age groups, that 
is, 30–40, 40–50, and 50–59. Further, we estimate the probability of continuation or 
changes in the employment status in the next year based on the educational level within 
that age group. The transition probabilities of employment status are presented in Table 
3.2.18  
 
15 The amount of per capita subsidy from the social welfare programs provided by the Thai government is 
around 12,000 Thai baht per year, which is equivalent to 5.5% of the GDP per capita in the year 2017. 
Therefore, we use 5% of the average earnings in our model that is roughly equivalent to the real economy. 
(Details of the social welfare in Thailand are in appendix)  
16 Here, we use the HSES data from the years 2013, 2015, and 2017. This is because they report the actual 
value of financial assets. Wealth is defined as the total net worth that is calculated from the total value of 
household assets (including house, land, and building) minus total liability. Income is the current average 
monthly household income.  
17 We do not restrict the study only to male household heads. This is to prevent obtaining insufficient 
samples for each sector of employment in each age group.  





In our model, earnings are exogenous. During working age, the earnings of 
workers consist of a deterministic part that is the same for everyone at the same age and 
characteristics, and an idiosyncratic component that captures an individual’s earnings risk. 
The deterministic component of earnings for both formal and informal workers is 
estimated using the equation 3.2.  
For the idiosyncratic shock components of earnings, we calibrate the shock 
parameters to match consumption inequality from the HSES data. We set 𝜎𝛼
2 = 0.115 for 
both sectors, 𝜌 = 0.970, 𝜎𝜀
2 = 0.195 and 𝜎𝜂
2 = 0.023 for the formal sector, and 𝜌 =
0.825 , 𝜎𝜀
2 = 0.240  and 𝜎𝜂
2 = 0.190  for the informal sector. As we allow for the 
transition between sectors to take place, agents who change the sector will have zero 
persistence (𝜌 = 0 ) while 𝜎𝜀
2  and 𝜎𝜂
2  are set according to the new sector. All three 
components of earnings shocks in each sector are discretized using five grid points. Then, 
the transition probabilities are chosen following the procedure described in Tauchen 
(1986).  
After retirement, everyone receives an old-age transfer from the government. 
There is an old-age allowance system in Thailand to provide monthly cash transfers to 
the elderly, aged 60 and above. The amount transferred depends on the age of recipients. 
In this system, 60–69-year-olds receive 600 Thai baht, 70–79-year-olds receive 700 Thai 
baht, 80–89-year-olds receive 800 Thai baht, and those who are 90 years of age and older 










We begin with an economy that we call the “basic economy” in which all agents must 
retire after they reach the retirement age. We match the basic model to the aggregate 
wealth-to-income ratio and consumption inequality profile. The model outcomes and data 
are presented in Table 3.3. Figures 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 display the results from the basic 
model, namely, the age-profile of earnings and consumption inequality. The model is 
successful at capturing the main feature of the data that both earnings and consumption 
inequality increases with age.  
Earnings inequality from the HSES data in Figure 3.3 grows slightly faster than 
in our model. Quantitatively, our model’s earnings inequality is 20% higher at age 30 and 
ends up being 26% lower at retirement. Our model cannot perfectly match the earnings 
inequality from the data because we calibrate earnings shocks to match consumption 
inequality, which is our main target. However, the model can exhibit an increasing pattern 
of earnings inequality profile.  
Consumption inequality in Figure 3.4 is consistent with the data until age 50 and 
starts to grow faster as the age increases, being 17.7% higher at retirement. Figure 3.5 
illustrates consumption inequality profiles by sector. Consumption inequality diverge 
from the data after age 40 for the formal sector and around age 50 for the informal sector. 
A possible reason for the divergence between the basic model and data can be the 
existence of some insurance arrangements to actual agents that are not available in the 
model. Based on this assumption, we extend our model in the next section to include some 
features available in the Thai economy to prove whether they can improve the 





3.4 Extension of the Model  
In the basic model, there is an extensive increase in consumption inequality starting from 
age 50. Storesletten et al. (2004) point out the absence of risk-sharing features such as the 
choice of labor hour, retirement decision, and social security can explain the deviation of 
the model from the data. Thus, we extend our model to allow for old-age employment 
and further introduce the social security system. 
 
3.4.1 Old-Age Employment 
For developing countries, old-age employment is one of the main income sources for 
older people. For example, in Thailand, 31% of the elderly report income from work as 
their main source of income.21 Thus, we now allow old agents to continue to work until 
they face a retirement shock. 
After reaching the retirement age, all agents face a retirement shock every period. 
If they are hit by the shock, they must retire. If not, they can continue to work in the same 
sector of employment. 22  For elderly workers, their earnings depend on their age, 
educational level, and sector of employment. Their earnings profile is estimated using the 
HSES data by selecting male heads of the household aged 60–80, who are working and 
have positive earnings. Table 3.4 reports the estimation results and we use these 
coefficients to determine the earnings for the elderly in our model. The budget constraints 
for the elderly are then as follows: 
 
21 The three main sources of income for elderly persons are transfers from child(ren) (34.7%), working 
(31%), and old-age allowance (20%) (NSO, 2017). 
22 The data shows that the transition between sectors after the age 60 is 12% for formal workers and only 





𝑐 + 𝑎′ =  (1 +  𝑟)𝑎 +  𝐼𝑟  ∙ 𝐸 +  𝑡𝑟ℎ≥𝐻𝑟  + 𝑇,     (3.13) 
 𝑙𝑛(𝐸)  =  𝑓(ℎ,  𝑠,  𝑒𝑑𝑢)      𝑖𝑓 ℎ ≥ 𝐻𝑟 ,      (3.14) 
𝑇⁡ = ⁡max{0, 𝑐 ⁡−⁡ [(1⁡ + ⁡𝑟)𝑎𝑖,ℎ ⁡+ ⁡ 𝐼𝑟  ∙ 𝐸⁡ +⁡ 𝑡𝑟ℎ≥𝐻𝑟]},    (3.15) 
𝑎 ≥  0; 𝑐 ≥  0.        (3.16) 
Here, 𝐼𝑟 = 1 if an agent continues to work and 0 otherwise. 𝑓(ℎ, 𝑠, 𝑒𝑑𝑢) is an old-age 
earnings profile. The model is recalibrated, where 𝜇 = 3 and 𝛽⁡ = ⁡0.987. 
 Figures 3.6 and 3.7 present the results for the old-age employment model. The 
consumption dispersion after age 50 decreases and becomes close to the data. Old-age 
employment appears to provide a better explanation of the data. Working during old age 
appears to serve as an insurance arrangement after the retirement age. This is intuitive. In 
our basic model, the insurance arrangement for old age is very small. When agents are hit 
by bad earnings shocks, they must sacrifice their consumption more to guarantee that they 
will have enough savings for old age. As a result, it leads to an increase in consumption 
inequality. Similarly, if the insurance is available, unlucky agents can save less than in 
the basic model to ensure their consumption at old age. Therefore, the increase in 
inequality becomes smaller. 
 
3.4.2 Social Security 
We incorporate the social security into the old-age employment model and examine how 
it affects consumption inequality. The conditions for social security are based on the Thai 
social security system. Only agents who work in the formal sector for at least 15 years 
can receive a pension when they reach the retirement age. The pension benefit is 





of the average earnings before retirement, with maximum monthly earnings used to 
calculate at 15,000 Thai baht. The new budget constraints for old agents are then as 
follows: 
𝑐 + 𝑎′ =  (1 +  𝑟)𝑎 +  𝐼𝑟  ∙ 𝐸 +  𝑡𝑟ℎ≥𝐻𝑟  + 𝐼𝑠 ∙ 𝑝 + 𝑇,   (3.17) 
 𝑙𝑛(𝐸)  =  𝑓(ℎ,  𝑠,  𝑒𝑑𝑢)      𝑖𝑓 ℎ ≥ 𝐻𝑟 ,      (3.18) 
𝑇 =  𝑚𝑎𝑥{0,  𝑐 −  [(1 +  𝑟)𝑎 +  𝐼𝑟  ∙ 𝐸 +  𝑡𝑟ℎ≥𝐻𝑟 +  𝐼𝑠 ∙  𝑝]} ,  (3.19) 
 𝑝⁡ = ⁡min(?̂?, 𝑠𝑠⁡ ∙ ⁡𝐸𝐻𝑟−1),        (3.20) 
𝑎 ≥  0; 𝑐 ≥  0,         (3.21) 
where p is the amount of a pension received after retirement age.23 𝐼𝑠 ⁡= ⁡1 if the sector 
of employment at age 𝐻𝑟 ⁡− ⁡1 is the formal sector. ss is the replacement rate and ?̂? is the 
maximum amount of pension each individual can receive. We recalibrate the model where 
𝜇 = 4 and 𝛽⁡ = ⁡0.952. 
 Figures 3.6 and 3.7 also plot the consumption inequality profile from the model 
with the social security. The pattern of the consumption inequality profile is closer to the 
data at all ages compared to the basic model and the old-age employment model. Figure 
3.8 exhibits the average asset holdings and consumption profiles between the formal and 
informal sectors. On average, formal workers have higher assets and consumption levels 
at every age than informal workers.  
 In general, the old-age employment and social security can explain the unobserved 
risk-sharing arrangement that is absent in the basic model. We find that consumption 
inequality can be reduced from the basic model by 27.6% in the old-age employment 
 
23 We simplify our calculation for pension by using the earnings at age 𝐻𝑟 ⁡− ⁡1 instead of average monthly 
wage in the last 60 months before retirement, according to the Thai social security system. This is because 





model and 29% in the model with a combination of old-age employment and social 
security. Moreover, the extended model with social security can match consumption 
inequality better than the other two models. Therefore, we will use this model as a 
benchmark economy to conduct policy experiments in the next section. 
 
3.5 Policy Experiments 
In this section, we investigate the impacts of the social insurance policy on consumption 
and saving behaviors, as well as inequality. We consider two policy reforms, namely, the 
extension of the social welfare system and extension of the pension scheme. The extended 
model with the social security is used as a benchmark economy for all policy experiments.  
 
3.5.1 Extension of Social Welfare  
The social welfare system provides benefits or support to the people who are in need. 
Many countries have developed their own systems to accommodate the needs of their 
people that usually consist of numerous programs with different requirements. Here, we 
use the consumption floor (𝑐) that the government guarantees as a measure. Generally, 
developed countries provide good social welfare to their people. Hubbard et al. (1995) 
calculate the size of social welfare in the US by using the guaranteed consumption floor 
and suggest the amount of subsidy was approximately 15% of the GDP per capita in 1984. 
For developing economies, the size of the social welfare can be much smaller than that in 
developed countries. Thus, we conduct experiments to examine the effect of social 





For our analysis, we examine the impact of social welfare by varying the level of 
minimum consumption floor (i.e., values of 𝑐 ). In the benchmark model, we set 𝑐 to five 
percent of the average earnings. We conduct two policy experiments. The first experiment 
is on the economy that has a very small sized social welfare program with 𝑐 = 1% of 
average earnings, which we will refer to as “low social welfare” hereafter. The second 
experiment is on the economy that has a relatively large sized social welfare program 
with 𝑐 ⁡= 15% of the average earnings, which we will refer to as “high social welfare” 
hereafter.  
Figure 3.9 exhibits the results of our policy experiments. We find that a larger size 
of the social welfare program does not have a significant impact on reducing consumption 
inequality, except those very young (age 30-40) and very old (age 70-80). At young ages, 
there are more people who affect from minimum consumption floor since their income 
level is still low and they do not have lots of asset holdings. For middle-aged people, it 
does not have an impact on reducing inequality because the minimum consumption floor 
affects only those who face bad earnings shocks. The high level of minimum consumption 
floor discourages savings of the poor people but does not affect high-income people. As 
a result, low-income people have fewer asset holdings after retirement age than high-
income people, which increases inequality after retirement. 
Table 3.5 reports the average non-negative saving rate by young agents from each 
experiment. The saving rate increases from 33.9% in the benchmark to 35.6% in the low 
social welfare economy. On the other hand, the saving rate decreases to 30.9% in the high 
social welfare economy. These results indicate the saving rate among the young can be 






3.5.2 Pension Extension to Informal Workers 
In developing countries, the development of the social security system is not 
comprehensive. Typically, informal workers are not eligible for the pension in old age. 
For this policy experiment, we aim to investigate the impact of extending the pension to 
cover informal workers.  
In the benchmark economy, only formal workers are qualified to receive a pension 
after retirement. In our analysis, we remove this restriction and allow all agents to be 
eligible to receive a post-retirement pension. The pension is calculated using the same 
method as that used for formal workers. 
Figure 3.10 presents the consumption inequality from the model with pension 
extension compared to the benchmark model. For old age, consumption inequality is 
reduced because everyone is eligible to receive a pension. Moreover, it also reduces 
inequality for young people. This is because individuals have to save when they are in the 
working-age for their retirement. If they are hit by bad earnings shocks, their earnings 
become lower, but they have to maintain the level of savings. As a result, they have to 
sacrifice their consumption for savings, which increases inequality. However, if a pension 
is available to everyone, they rely less on savings. Although they are hit by bad earnings 
shocks, they do not have to lower their consumption to maintain their savings for 
retirement. Thus, inequality is reduced.    
Table 3.6 reports the average non-negative saving rate by young agents from our 
experiment. The saving rate decreases from 33.9% in the benchmark to 33.3% in the 







This study investigates if the increase in earnings and consumption inequality with age 
can be explained by the earnings shocks that an individual faces over the life cycle. By 
developing a life cycle model with uninsured earnings shocks, we find that key factors to 
explain consumption inequality are the idiosyncratic earnings shocks, working during old 
age, and social security.  
 We investigate the impact of earnings shocks on consumption and saving 
behaviors by developing a stochastic life cycle model in developing countries with the 
existence of the informal sector. Agents face life expectancy, employment, and earnings 
shocks. They are allowed to change their employment sector throughout their working 
life and must retire when they reach age 60. Our model can capture the increasing pattern 
of earnings inequality. In terms of consumption inequality, it is 17% higher at retirement 
than the data. Thus, we extend our model to allow for old-age employment and introduce 
the social security system. We find that consumption inequality is reduced by 27.6% and 
29% relative to the benchmark model in the old-age employment and social security 
models, respectively. The consumption inequality from the model with the social security 
system is well-matched with the data.  
We use the model with a combination of old-age employment and social security 
to examine consumption and savings behaviors. We examine two policy reforms, namely, 
the extension of social welfare and extension of the social security system. 
First, we discuss the impact of the social welfare system by varying the amount 
of the minimum consumption floor guaranteed by the government. Our finding indicates 





workers and very old persons. We find that consumption inequality is lowered than the 
benchmark model by around 19.8% at age 30 and 9.6% at age 80, and the saving rate 
decreases by four percentage points, relative to a low social welfare level. 
Second, we extend the social security to cover the informal sector such that all 
workers can receive a pension after the retirement age. We find that the extension of social 






3.A Tables  
Table 3.1 Parameters 
Parameters Interpretation Value Source/Target 
ℎ Model period 1 Equivalent to one year and start 
at age 25 
𝐻𝑟 Retirement age 36 Equivalent to age 60 
𝐻 Maximum years after 
labor force entry 
56 Equivalent to age 80  
𝛽 Discount factor 0.960 Match wealth-to-income ratio 
𝜇 Risk aversion 3 Match wealth-to-income ratio 
𝜓ℎ Survival probability at 
age h 
 
(1-probability of dying between 
ages h and h + n) * 
𝑃𝑠
ℎ, 𝑒𝑑𝑢(𝑠′|𝑠) Transition probability of 
employment 
 
Estimated from Townsend’s 
panel data 
r Rate-of-return on capital 0.0158 Weighted average deposit 
interest rate 
𝜎𝛼
2 Fixed effect 0.115       
{𝜌𝑓 , 𝜌𝑖𝑛𝑓} Persistent parameter {0.970, 0.825} 
{𝜎𝜀,𝑓
2 , 𝜎𝜀,𝑖𝑛𝑓
2 } Transitory shock {0.195, 0.240} 
{𝜎𝜂,𝑓
2 , ⁡𝜎𝜂,𝑖𝑛𝑓
2 } Persistent shock  {0.023, 0.190} 






Table 3.2 Transition Probabilities of Employment Status 
Age 
Group 












Formal 0.911 0.082 0.007  0.743 0.243 0.014 
Informal 0.083 0.904 0.013  0.036 0.954 0.010 
Not working 0.160 0.480 0.360  0.000 0.403 0.597 
40–50 
Formal 0.922 0.074 0.004  0.739 0.259 0.003 
Informal 0.053 0.939 0.008  0.023 0.970 0.007 
Not working 0.091 0.455 0.455  0.029 0.304 0.667 
50–59 
Formal 0.928 0.064 0.008  0.795 0.187 0.018 
Informal 0.043 0.944 0.013  0.018 0.973 0.010 
Not working 0.000 0.417 0.583  0.043 0.414 0.543 





Table 3.3 Model Outcomes 





Wealth-to-income ratio     
   Aggregate 3.64 3.64 3.64 3.64 
   High education 3.10 3.25 3.30 3.11 







Table 3.4 Estimation Results of the Age–Earnings Profile for Old-Age Employment 
Variable ln Earnings 
Age (ℎ𝑖𝑡) -0.0336 
 (0.029) 
Age squared (ℎ𝑖𝑡
2 ) 0.0002 
 (0.000) 
Formal sector dummy (𝑠𝑖) 0.6019** 
 (0.216) 
Formal*Age (𝑠𝑖 ∗ ℎ𝑖𝑡) -0.0103 
 (0.006) 
High education dummy (𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖) 0.4711* 
 (0.239) 
High education*Age (𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖 ∗ ℎ𝑖𝑡) -0.0127 
 (0.007) 






Source: Author’s estimation based on SES data in 2002–2017, NSO. 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 






Table 3.5 Saving Rates of Young Agents, Extension of Social Welfare 
 1% ?̅? 5% ?̅? 15% ?̅? 
Saving rate    
   Aggregate 35.6% 33.9% 30.9% 
   Formal 30.0% 28.4% 25.9% 
   Informal 37.7% 36.0% 32.8% 
   Note: ?̅? is average earnings. 
 
Table 3.6 Saving Rates of Young Agents, Extension of Social Security 
 Benchmark Pension extension 
Saving rate   
   Aggregate 33.9% 33.3% 
   Formal 28.4% 27.9% 








Figure 3.1 Variance of the Logarithm of the Earnings and Consumption. 





Figure 3.2 Variance of the Logarithm of the Earnings and Consumption by Sector. 
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Appendix 
Social Welfare Programs in Thailand 
The social welfare system was recently introduced in Thailand. Households in 
Thailand can be qualified for two means-tested programs if they meet the government’s 
income and assets test. The first program is the Child Support Grant (CSG) scheme that 
was first introduced in 2015. The CSG scheme provides a monthly subsidy to babies and 
toddlers from low-income families. Families with an average monthly income of less than 
3,000 Thai baht per person are eligible to receive 600 baht per child per month. The 
second program is the welfare card program that was implemented in 2017. There are 
five criteria for the welfare card program. The individual must be (a) a Thai citizen; (b) 
at least 18 years of age; (c) unemployed or an annual income below 100,000 baht; (d) no 
financial assets worth more than 100,000 baht; and (e) no owned real estate. The qualified 
households can receive a monthly allowance of 300 baht per person to shop for necessities 
at designated shops. In addition, the welfare card provides monthly subsidies for 
transportation that are 500 baht for buses/BTS/MRT, 500 baht for inter-city public 
transportation services, and 500 baht for trains.  
Following Hubbard (1995), the total means-tested social welfare is calculated 
based on the representative household, which is a female-headed household with two 
children and no earnings and assets. This household can receive child subsidy benefits 
from CSG amounting to 1,200 baht per month and a monthly allowance from the welfare 
card of 1,800 baht per month. Therefore, the total means-tested social benefits are 
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approximately 36,000 Thai baht per household year.24 The per capita subsidy it was 5.5% 
of the GDP per capita in 2017.25 
  
 
24 It is equal to (300 + (500 x 3) + (600 x 2)) x 12 = 36,000 Thai baht. 
25 The per capita subsidy is (36,000/3) and GDP per capita in Thailand as of 2017 was 218,200 Thai baht.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Health Insurance and Household Savings26  
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the relationship between health insurance coverage and 
precautionary saving decisions. Individuals face uncertainties throughout their lives. 
Medical expenditures is a major uncertainty in one’s life. To prevent the impact of future 
uncertainties and maintain a smooth consumption level, individuals typically withhold a 
portion of their current income as a precautionary saving and/or purchase health insurance. 
The standard theory of consumption and precautionary saving suggests that the 
introduction of insurance reduces the amount of precautionary savings. The expectation 
that health insurance coverage and savings are partially substitutable has been used to test 
the existence of a precautionary motive for saving.   
However, empirical findings based on private health insurance coverage are not 
consistent with theoretical expectation and are mostly focused on the US and other 
developed countries. Starr-McCluer (1996) examine the relationship between health 
insurance and savings using the US Survey of Consumer Finances data and finds that 
insured households save more than comparable households without coverage. Similarly, 
Guariglia and Rossi (2004) use the British Household Panel Survey data to investigate 
the effect of private medical insurance on household savings. They find a positive 
correlation between insurance coverage and savings. Both of these studies suggest that 
 
26 This chapter is a part of a joint project with Minchung Hsu, Pei-Ju Liao and Chang-Ching Lin on health 
insurance and precautionary savings.   
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private health insurance does not generally crowd-out savings, and indicate that the 
precautionary motive for saving is insignificant.  
Therefore, this study aims to investigate the effect of health insurance on private 
savings in Thailand. We focus our analysis towards determining whether households who 
are not covered by private health insurance save more than insured households as a 
precaution against the risk of medical expenditures. We define private health insurance 
to include both self-purchased insurance and employment-based insurance. According to 
our interpretation of formal/informal workers, this implies that those who are insured or 
have private health insurance are mainly workers in the formal sector and those who are 
uninsured are workers in the informal sector.  
We select Thailand for our empirical analysis for two main reasons. First, 
Thailand introduced the Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS) since 2002, which is public 
health insurance with universal provision and almost free of charge.27 As the UCS insures 
all Thai citizens against unexpected health expenditure, there should be no crowding-out 
of saving by private health insurance. Kirdruang and Glewwe (2018) study the impact of 
UCS on households’ consumption and savings in Thailand and find that the UCS had no 
impact on savings. However, a recent study by Ushijima (2020) evidences a decrease in 
household precautionary savings after the introduction of UCS in Thailand.   
Second, although the UCS provides health care services at a reduced price, 
individuals prefer to use private health services because private hospitals typically 
provide a higher quality of medical treatment and services. In addition, while 
employment-based insurance covers both private and public hospitals, the UCS covers 
 
27 Initially, the scheme levied a charge of 30 baht (~$0.75) per service contact. (Limwattananon et al., 2015) 
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only public hospitals. Moreover, to use the UCS service, an individual has to register at a 
single, designated public hospital and cannot use the UCS elsewhere. During an 
emergency, an uninsured person might face unexpected out-of-pocket medical 
expenditures as they might have to go to a hospital that is not covered by the USC. As a 
result, uninsured individuals might save for precautionary purpose more than those with 
insurance and private health insurance might crowd-out saving.   
To investigate this, we use data from the Thai Household Socio-Economic Survey 
(HSES) between 2011 and 2017. For our analysis, we follow the methodology used by 
Guariglia and Rossi (2004) to analyze the relationship between saving and private health 
insurance. We start with the Tobit estimation for the decision to save. We then use an 
Instrumental Variables (IV) technique and a Full Model Maximum Likelihood approach 
to control for endogeneity.  
Our empirical findings give interesting results. We find a positive relationship 
between saving and health insurance in the Tobit model. While contradicting the theory 
of precautionary saving, this is in line with findings from the literature. In their study, 
Guariglia and Rossi (2004) suggest that there might be a bias due to endogeneity caused 
by individual perceptions of risk. Accordingly, we use the IV Tobit and Full Model 
Maximum Likelihood approaches to control for endogeneity. We find a negative 
association, albeit statistically insignificant, between saving and health insurance 
coverage using the IV Tobit specification. This suggests that the positive relationship 
between insurance coverage and saving in the Tobit model was the result of an 
endogeneity bias. We further control for endogeneity using a Full Model Maximum 
Likelihood technique and find a statistically significant negative relationship between 
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saving and health insurance coverage. Our findings thus provide strong evidence in 
support of the theory that private health insurance reduces precautionary saving.    
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our dataset and 
descriptive statistics. Section 3 provides the empirical specification of the Tobit model 
and its results. Section 4 explains how we control for endogeneity using the IV Tobit 
specification and a Full Model Maximum Likelihood approach. Section 5 concludes.  
 
4.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
4.2.1 Data 
We used data from the Household Socio-Economic Survey (HSES) between 2011 and 
2017.28 Observations in our dataset are restricted to household heads aged between 25 
and 54 years old who are in employment in order to avoid the effect of schooling, 
retirement, and unemployment on savings. Households with self-employed heads are 
excluded because it is particularly difficult to distinguish family savings from the firms’ 
investment. Households with heads working in the public sector are also excluded. The 
sample used in the analysis is made up of 22,406 observations. All income and spending 
variables are expressed in Thai baht as of 2015. 
 Monthly household savings are calculated as income minus consumption 
expenditures.29 The HSES provides detailed data on household income and expenditure 
as well as information on whether a household has employment-based health insurance 
or purchase any non-saving insurance. We use the question “at present, do you receive 
 
28 The surveys used in the study are from 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017. 
29 We use average monthly consumption expenditures and average monthly current income from the survey 
to calculate savings.   
 
 
 74   
 
the following welfare of medical services?” to identify whether a household is covered 
by employment-based or private health insurance (EPHI) or not. If a household answer 
“medical card (social security), private health insurance, or welfare by employer”, it is 
classified as covered by EPHI. 
 
4.2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the discussed variables are summarized in Table 4.1. In terms of 
income and spending variables, the average monthly household income is 26,438 Thai 
baht. The average household monthly savings is 4,750 Thai baht and the average health 
expenditure is 189 Thai baht. Around 76.64% of all households have positive savings and 
61.58% are covered by EPHI. Regarding household characteristic variables, the average 
number of adults and the average number of dependent children in a household are 2.14 
and 0.51, respectively. Only 9% of households have mortgage debts. The average age of 
a household head is around 40 years old.  
 Descriptive statistics on saving behavior and insurance coverage for various 
social-demographic groups are presented in Table 4.2. Column 1 shows the percentages 
of savers, of which 76.64% have positive savings. The proportion of savers increases with 
the education and income levels of household heads. Households whose heads are aged 
between 45 and 54 years old, are not married or co-habiting, and have no dependent child 
have a higher percentage of savers. 
Column 2 shows the percentages of households covered by EPHI. Overall, 61.68% 
of the dataset are covered. The proportions of EPHI coverage show a similar pattern to 
the percentages of savers in column 1, in that the respondents who are not married or co-
habiting and do not have dependent children are more likely to have EPHI coverage. The 
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percentage of those with EPHI coverage also tends to increase with the income level of 
household heads.  
 Columns 3–6 show the percentages of savers who were insured and uninsured and 
the amount saved by them. The EPHI insured households tend to have higher proportions 
of savers as well as higher amounts of savings than uninsured households. This pattern 
holds for the whole dataset and the various social-demographic groups reported in Table 
4.2. Overall, the percentage of savers with EPHI coverage is 79.94%, compared with 
71.34% of those without. The average monthly savings of those with coverage is 8,879 
Thai baht, whereas the average monthly savings for those without is 4,983 Thai baht. The 
percentage of savers and the amount of savings tends to rise with education and income 
levels for both insured and uninsured households. 
 These descriptive statistics show a positive correlation between private health 
insurance and saving. This suggests that Thai individuals who are uninsured by the EPHI 
save less for unexpected medical expenditures. In the next section, we follow the 
methodology outlined by Guarglia and Rossi (2004) to test whether this conclusion is 
robust. 
 
4.3 Empirical Specification and Results 
4.3.1 General Specification 
The empirical specifications used in this study follow Guariglia and Rossi (2004). First, 
the Tobit estimation technique is used to analyze the determinants of individual saving 
decisions and to study how insurance coverage affect savings decisions. We use this 
technique because saving is calculated from income minus consumption expenditure, 
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which could be either a positive or negative value. However, there is a possibility that 
income is under-reported. The negative saving might be observed because households 
actually dissave, or they are unintended to under-reported their income. As a result, we 
truncate all negative savings to zero and use the Tobit technique. The regression equation 
is as follows:  
𝑆𝑖






 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁.     (4.1) 
𝑆𝑖
∗ is the true propensity to save of the household, which could be either a positive or 
negative value. However, negative values are truncated to zero and would not be observed 
due to censoring. Thus,  𝑆𝑖  denotes the observed saving of household i, allowing for 
positive or zero savings. 𝑃𝑖 is a dummy variable coded as 1 if household i is covered by 
EPHI and 0 otherwise. 𝑋𝑖 are other covariates that are assumed to affect saving, listed in 
the Appendix. Finally, 𝑒𝑖 is an idiosyncratic error term. 
 
4.3.2 Tobit Regression Results 
The regression results are shown in column 1 and 2 of Table 4.3. The coefficient of 
𝑃𝑖 is positive and statistically significant, and shows that those with EPHI tend to save 
more than those without by 2,457.44 Thai baht. This positive correlation suggests that 
insurance coverage does not crowd-out private savings, which is consistent with the 
findings from Guariglia and Rossi (2004). Our results show that savings tend to be higher 
for households with higher permanent incomes and more employed adults. In contrast, 
savings tend to be lower for those with older household heads, household heads who are 
married, and for households with more dependent adults or children living within the 
household. Interestingly, the coefficient of education and mortgage debt diverges from 
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our expectations. The households that have heads with higher education degrees tend to 
save less, whereas those with mortgage debts tend to have more savings.  
  
4.4 Controlling for Endogeneity 
It is possible that the results from the Tobit regression might be biased due to endogeneity. 
Similar to saving, the decision to purchase medical insurance may depend on households’ 
perceptions of risk. 30  Households that are more risk-averse tend to save more for 
precautionary reasons than less risk-averse households. Thus, instead of having low levels 
of savings, households with EPHI coverage may also tend to have a higher levels of 
savings because they are more risk-averse.  
 
4.4.1 Instrumental Variables Tobit Regression and Results 
An IV Tobit model is used to account for endogeneity from unobservable factors affecting 
saving and insurance purchasing decisions. Occupational dummies are selected as 
instrument variables on the insurance coverage variable (𝑃𝑖).  
The first criterion with which to evaluate whether occupational dummies are 
suitable instrument variables is that they should be strongly correlated with insurance 
coverage.31 As 96% of the insured households receive coverage through the firm by 
which they are employed, it is reasonable to assume that occupation-related variables are 
good proxies for insurance coverage. Occupations that are mostly available in the formal 
 
30  In this study, insurance coverage is an employment-based insurance that is paid by an employer. 
Therefore, the relevant decision can be to join a firm that provides private health insurance.  
31  Medical insurance subsidies are usually occupation-based. Guariglia and Rossi (2004) also use 
occupational dummies as proxies for insurance coverage, as 71 percent of the dataset received their 
insurance coverage through the firms by which they were employed.  
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sector, such as professionals and technicians, are more likely to be covered by the EPHI 
than service workers.32 To test for this requirement, a regression of 𝑃𝑖 on the occupational 
dummies and the other exogenous variables is performed using a Probit method. Wald 
test (Judge et al., 1985) is then used to test for the joint significant of these instruments. 
The results show a 𝜒2(4) statistic equal to 847.31 with a p-value of 0.000, indicating that 
the occupational dummies generally have a high explanatory power for health insurance 
coverage.  
Another requirement for instrument validity is that they should have no predictive 
power on savings when a regression includes 𝑃𝑖 and other exogenous variables. Using a 
Tobit model to test the joint significance of the occupational dummies, a regression on all 
exogenous variables 𝑋𝑖, insurance coverage, and the occupational dummies gives an F(4, 
22376) equal to 2.74 with p-value of 0.027. Although the p-value is not high enough to 
suggest that the instruments do not directly affect the savings, the instruments are still 
valid because there is no coefficient related to the occupational dummies that is 
individually statistically significant in the regression.  
We then performed a Basmann (1960) test to test for an over-identifying 
restriction by regressing the residuals from the IV Tobit model on the occupation 
dummies and all other exogenous variables and testing the joint significance of the 
instruments. The regression gives an F(4, 22376) equal to 1.58 with p-value of 0.1764, 
suggesting that the instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals and thus have no 
predictive power for saving and are legitimate.   
 
32 More than 90 percent of professionals and technicians work in the formal sector, while 39 percent of 
service workers work in the formal sector (The informal employment survey 2019, NSO). 
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 Following the procedure illustrated in Newey (1987), the estimated results of the 
saving equation based on the IV-Tobit model are reported in column 3 and 4 of Table 4.3. 
Our result differs from those of Guariglia and Rossi (2004) because the coefficient on the 
insurance coverage (-2289.10) becomes negative, although it is not significant. This 
suggests that the positive correlation between insurance coverage and savings could be 
affected by the endogeneity bias. The effects of the other exogenous variables on savings 
are similar to the Tobit model.  
 
4.4.2 Full Model Maximum Likelihood Regression 
An alternative, and more efficient, way to address the endogeneity of insurance coverage 
is to use a Full Model Maximum Likelihood (FMML) approach. This method considers 
the interdependence between health insurance coverage and saving decisions.  
 The detailed specification of the FMML function also follows Guariglia and Rossi 
(2004). Two sets of equations are used, the insurance coverage equation and the saving 
equation. The equation determining whether households have EPHI is described as 
follows: 
𝑃𝑖





          (4.2) 
where 𝜛𝑖 includes variables in 𝑋𝑖 as well as occupational dummies. Another equation for 
saving behavior is described by 
𝑆𝑖
∗ = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑃𝑖
∗ + Γ𝑋𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖 = 𝜆𝜛𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,     (4.3) 
where 𝜀𝑖 = 𝛾𝑢𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖 and 𝑆𝑖 = 𝑆𝑖
∗ if 𝑆𝑖
∗ > 0; otherwise, 𝑆𝑖 = 0. The error terms from the 
insurance coverage and saving equations are assumed to be jointly normally distributed 
with a zero mean and a variance-covariance matrix: 
 
 









where the variance of 𝑢𝑖 is normalized to 1. The correlation between the error terms, 𝑢𝑖 
and 𝜀𝑖, reflects the risk aversion term, which is not observed and is contained in the error 
terms of both equations. Allowing the covariance between 𝑢𝑖  and 𝜀𝑖  to be non-zero 
prevents the coefficient on insurance coverage in eq. (4.3) from including a risk aversion 
component, thus removing this bias.  
Based on the observed values of 𝑆𝑖 and 𝑃𝑖, households can be classified into four 
groups. Denoting the univariate normal density function with φ, the univariate normal 
cumulative distribution function with Φ𝑛, the bivariate normal cumulative distribution 
function with Φ𝑏, the variance of ε𝑖 with 𝜎𝜀
2, and the covariance between 𝑢𝑖 and 𝜀𝑖 with 
𝜎𝜀𝑢, and letting ξ = 𝜎𝜀𝑢/𝜎𝜀
2 and ζ = 𝜎𝜀𝑢/𝜎𝜀, the probabilities related to each group can 
be written as follows:  
Group 1: Households who save and are insured, such that: 
Pr(𝑆𝑖
∗ > 0;𝑃𝑖
∗ > 0) = Pr(𝑆𝑖
∗) Pr(𝑃𝑖
∗ > 0|𝑆𝑖




Group 2: Households who do not save and are insured, such that: 
Pr(𝑆𝑖
∗ ≤ 0;𝑃𝑖
∗ > 0) = Φ𝑏 (
−𝜆𝜛𝑖
𝜎𝜀
, 𝜃𝜛𝑖 , −𝜁). 
Group 3: Households who save and are not insured, such that: 
Pr(𝑆𝑖
∗ > 0;𝑃𝑖
∗ ≤ 0) = Pr(𝑆𝑖
∗) Pr(𝑃𝑖
∗ ≤ 0|𝑆𝑖




Group 4: Households who do not save and are not insured, such that:  
Pr(𝑆𝑖
∗ ≤ 0;𝑃𝑖
∗ ≤ 0) = Φ𝑏 (
−𝜆𝜛𝑖
𝜎𝜀
, −𝜃𝜛𝑖 , 𝜁). 
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The log-likelihood function used to estimate the parameters then takes the following form: 
𝐿 = ∑ ln[Pr(𝑆𝑖
∗ > 0;𝑃𝑖













∗ ≤ 0)] .
𝑖𝜖𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝4
 
 The estimates of the saving equation using the FMML method are reported in 
Table 4.4. Columns 1 and 2 show the results of the equation for insurance coverage. The 
probability of having coverage is lower for households with male household heads and 
those more children. The coefficients of the occupational dummies are all negative. This 
suggests that other occupations have a lower probability of being covered by the EPHI 
than “legislators, managers, and professionals.”33 It is higher for married household heads 
and those at all educational levels. Households with mortgage debt also have a higher 
probability of being covered by EPHI.  
The coefficient of EPHI insurance coverage (-20226.05) is negative and 
statistically significant. The magnitude of this coefficient implies a large impact of EPHI 
on saving that conditional on other family and head characteristics, saving of households 
with EPHI is lower than those without EPHI by 20,226 Thai bahts. The results of the 
explanatory variables on savings are still similar to those in the standard Tobit and IV-
Tobit models, except for the genders of household heads and educational dummies. In 
particular, the coefficients of all educational dummies become significantly positive, 
suggesting that saving tends to increase with educational attainment. Our result thus 
shows that there is evidence of a substitution effect between insurance coverage and 
 
33 “Legislators, managers, and professionals” is the omitted group.  
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saving. This supports the existence of precautionary saving as a hedge against health 
expenditure risks.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the association between employment-based/private health 
insurance coverage and private saving. We ask whether households who do not have 
EPHI coverage and can face unexpected health care expenditures for private health care 
services tend to save more than those with insurance. Our findings show that, after 
controlling for endogeneity, the insured households have significantly lower savings than 
those without EPHI coverage.  
 We follow the methodology outlined by Guariglia and Rossi (2004). Our result 
from the Tobit regression shows a strong positive correlation between EPHI and saving, 
in line with the findings of both Starr-McCluer (1996) and Guariglia and Rossi (2004). 
We then use the Instrumental Variables (IV) technique to investigate whether our 
estimates might have suffered from bias due to endogeneity. We find a negative effect of 
EPHI on saving, but it is not significant. We then take into account the interdependencies 
between health insurance coverage and saving decisions using a Full Model Maximum 
Likelihood approach. The resulting coefficient of insurance coverage on savings is 
negative and statistically significant. Our findings thus provide evidence for the 
crowding-out effect of health insurance coverage on private saving. This supports the 
theory of precautionary saving and confirms the significance of precautionary saving 
motive to reduce medical expenditure uncertainty.  
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4.A Tables 
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics 




Income and spending (Thai baht per month)   
   Current income                 26,438.06  26,916.45  
   Savings                   4,750.13  16,977.86  
   Health spending (out-of-pocket)                      188.62  765.56  
Household characteristics   
   No. of adults in a household                          2.14  1.00  
   No. of employed adults in a household 1.74  0.76  
   No. of children in a household 0.51  0.79  
   Age of household head  39.76 8.11 
  Frequency % 
Saving or not   
   Negative/zero 5,234 23.36 
   Positive 17,172 76.64 
EPHI coverage   
   Uncovered  8,609 38.42 
   Covered 13,797 61.58 
Mortgage debt    
   Others 20,388 90.99 
   Debtors              2,018  9.01 
Marital status   
   Married/co-habiting 15,137 67.56 
   Others 7,269 32.44 
Gender   
   Female  6,222 27.77 
   Male 16,184 72.23 
Education   
   High school dropout or lower 11,889 53.06 
   High school graduate 4,574 20.41 
   Some college 1,831 8.17 
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Table 4.2 Savings and Health Insurance Coverage by Demographic Characteristics, 
Age, Education, and Income 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
All 76.64  61.58  79.94  8,878.82  71.34  4,982.65  
Demographic variables       
   Married/co-habiting 76.43  59.99  80.08  10,196.59  70.95  5,349.42  
   Not married/co-habiting 77.08  64.88  79.69  6,328.86  72.27  4,128.45  
   No dependent child 79.39  66.83  81.50  7,749.31  75.13  4,993.58  
   With dependent    
   children 
71.75  52.21  76.40  11,628.06  66.66  4,967.41  
Age       
   25-34 77.17  52.21  78.68  5,709.33  73.41  4,943.18  
   35-44 75.41  64.07  78.68  9,117.36  68.19  4,943.18  
   45-54 77.59  49.95  82.28  12,414.52  72.91  5,300.98  
Education   
    
   High school dropout 74.16  46.79  77.42  5,476.09  71.29  4,647.84  
   High school graduate 76.28  73.11  79.01  6,314.72  68.86  5,952.47  
   Some college 77.99  87.82  79.10  8,938.89  69.96  6,087.25  
   College and above 83.61  79.82  85.59  16,480.65  75.78  5,803.39  
Income       
   First quartile 60.36  36.72  68.52  2,085.48  53.09  1,266.81  
   Second quartile 76.55  55.05  80.75  4,199.80  67.34  2,204.40  
   Third quartile 81.70  71.89  84.59  7,110.39  75.86  3,632.83  
   Forth quartile 88.81  85.31  91.02  25,221.62  83.52  9,749.09  
Notes: Column (1) reports the percentage of savers, Column (2) is the percentage of EPHI coverage in the 
dataset, Column (3) is the percentage of savers among EPHI insured, Column (4) is the non-zero average 
monthly savings of the EPHI insured (THB), Column (5) is the percentage of savers who do not have EPHI 
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EPHI insurance 2457.44*** (326.90) 
 
-2289.10 (1533.38) 
Permanent income  0.40*** (0.03) 
 
0.42*** (0.01) 
Health spending  1.28** (0.55) 
 
1.33*** (0.16) 
Demographic variables      
   Age  -601.70*** (176.74) 
 
-547.29*** (162.52) 
   Age-squared  796.91*** (220.16) 
 
695.96*** (204.75) 
   No. of emp.  1435.42*** (391.79) 
 
1211.98*** (284.88) 
   No. of dep adults  -394.89 (265.69) 
 
-428.98** (202.16) 
   No. of children  -986.24*** (223.94) 
 
-1295.17*** (199.51) 
   Male  384.83 (303.18) 
 
141.97 (313.55) 
   Married/co-habiting  -2001.60*** (375.96) 
 
-1929.23*** (327.75) 
Education      
   High school graduate  -1379.65*** (354.19) 
 
-738.52* (411.31) 
   Some college  -2028.63*** (504.20) 
 
-943.01 (626.90) 
   College degree or above  -1035.31* (534.91) 
 
-470.82 (545.07) 
Other Variables      
   Mortgage debtor  4003.70*** (656.96) 
 
4492.65*** (478.86) 
   2013 dummy 117.93 (379.71) 
 
168.53 (357.77) 
   2015 dummy  -733.72** (321.13) 
 
-682.69* (358.43) 
   2017 dummy  -843.79** (403.76) 
 
-773.41** (362.22) 
Constant  -1071.49 (3892.80) 
 
1474.91 (4000.47) 
Industrial dummies Yes   Yes  
Occupational dummies Yes   Yes  
Notes: *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. “High school dropout” is the omitted 
educational group. Source: The HSES, 2011-2017.
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EPHI insurance   -20226.05*** (359.01) 
Permanent income    0.48*** (0.01) 
Health spending  0.00*** (0.00) 1.52*** (0.18) 
Demographic variables     
   Age  0.05*** (0.01) -310.36* (177.18) 
   Age-squared  -0.07*** (0.01) 277.59 (221.87) 
   No. of emp.  0.00 (0.02) 347.81 (301.05) 
   No. of dep adults  -0.02 (0.01) -491.27** (221.23) 
   No. of children  -0.16*** (0.01) -2436.21*** (190.78) 
   Male  -0.20*** (0.02) -800.05** (333.33) 
   Married/co-habiting  0.08*** (0.02) -1581.32*** (358.38) 
Education     
   High school graduate  0.38*** (0.02) 1797.09*** (391.11) 
   Some college  0.84*** (0.04) 3218.57*** (574.30) 
   College degree or above  0.48*** (0.03) 1885.49*** (556.61) 
Occupation     
   Technicians and associate professionals -0.26*** (0.05)   
   Service, sales and clerical support workers -0.67*** (0.04)   
   Craft and related trades workers -1.01*** (0.05)   
   Plant and machine operators, and assemblers -0.57*** (0.05)   
Other Variables     
   Mortgage debtor  0.42*** (0.04) 6295.26*** (499.23) 
   2013 dummy 0.09*** (0.03) 369.36 (391.38) 
   2015 dummy  0.07*** (0.03) -477.94 (392.08) 
   2017 dummy  0.09*** (0.03) -497.36 (395.95) 
Constant  -0.08 (0.28) 11071.79*** (4285.14) 
Industrial dummies Yes Yes 
Notes: *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. “High school dropout” is the omitted 
educational group. “Legislators, managers, and professionals” is the omitted occupational group. Source: 
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Appendix 
Explanatory Variables used in Empirical Analysis 
The following covariates are considered in our regression:  
• Household permanent income: The permanent income is obtained by taking the 
fitted values from least squared regression of the household’s monthly current income on 
household characteristics and household heads’ marital status, gender, age, age-squared, 
educational dummies, occupational dummies, and the interactions of the latter two groups 
of dummies with age and age-squared.34 
• Family composition: The variables include the number of employed adults, the 
number of dependent adults, the number of children, and the marital status and gender of 
the household head to capture the composition of families. A different number of 
employed adults or children in families can reflect a difference in household income and 
consumption.  
• Education: Education level affect saving decision because those with higher 
education tend to save more due to higher income. The sample is classified into four 
groups according to the education level of household head: college and post-graduate 
graduates, post-secondary graduates, high school graduates, and high school dropouts or 
lower.  
• Age: The variables include age and age-squared of the household head to capture 
the curvature of the saving function. At different ages, people are facing financial 
 
34 Using permanent income can prevent a problem from a distortion of longer-run relationships between 
income and savings (Starr-McCluer, 1996). This approach follows Guariglia and Rossi (2004).  
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constraints and uncertainties differently, which can significantly result in different saving 
decisions.  
• Employment status: The employment uncertainty varies among people in different 
industries and occupations. The variables include industrial dummies and occupational 
dummies. 
• Health spending: Total health spending is used as a proxy for health status, which 
includes all health-related spending and medical expenditure.  
• Other variables: The mortgage debt variable is included because the ability to 
save of households with mortgage debts might be lower than those without mortgage debt. 
The survey year dummy variables are also included to capture the global changes from 
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Robustness Check  
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Estimation of Savings on EPHI 
In this section, we check the robustness of our estimation results by applying the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimation method and compare with the results from the Tobit model. 
We use the Tobit model to avoid the bias from under-reported household income. 
However, if the income is precisely reported, we can use the OLS method for the 
estimation. The regression equation for saving is as follows: 
𝑆𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑃𝑖 + Γ𝑋𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖,   𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁,       (4.4) 
where 𝑆𝑖 is the saving, which is calculated from income minus consumption expenditure. 
Equation 4.4 is also used for the Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation and the Full Model 
Maximum Likelihood (FMML) approach.  
Table A4.1 exhibits the results from the OLS and IV estimation, and Table A4.2 
presents the results from the FMML estimation. The coefficient of EPHI coverage on 
saving is significantly positive in the OLS model. After controlling for endogeneity, we 
find a negative effect of EPHI on savings. By using the IV technique, the coefficient of 
insurance coverage become negative but insignificant. The result from the FMML 
approach shows a strong negative effect of EPHI on saving. The estimation results are 
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EPHI insurance 3239.69*** (267.05) 
 
-1592.31 (1477.67) 
Permanent income  0.44*** (0.03) 
 
0.46*** (0.03) 
Health spending  1.74*** (0.62) 
 
1.79*** (0.62) 
Demographic variables      
   Age  -395.83** (155.37) 
 
-341.07** (152.97) 
   Age-squared  519.70*** (193.36) 
 
417.87** (189.36) 
   No. of emp.  862.93** (371.49) 
 
635.26 (393.53) 
   No. of dep adults  -679.73*** (248.83) 
 
-715.24*** (249.59) 
   No. of children  -1170.00*** (169.28) 
 
-1484.71*** (205.08) 
   Male  50.03 (281.79) 
 
-197.39 (291.76) 
   Married/co-habiting  -1139.17*** (334.00) 
 
-1064.23*** (331.80) 
Education      
   High school graduate  -1375.90*** (308.99) 
 
-723.84* (369.39) 
   Some college  -1766.08*** (458.87) 
 
-661.06 (482.53) 
   College degree or above  -1179.15** (544.20) 
 
-607.61 (532.40) 
Other Variables   
 
  
   Mortgage debtor       
   2013 dummy 5384.84*** (672.64) 
 
5882.93*** (680.11) 
   2015 dummy  -308.29 (343.20) 
 
-256.29 (347.49) 
   2017 dummy  -750.35** (304.74) 
 
-696.94** (305.36) 
Constant  -834.79** (357.78) 
 
-760.08** (356.68) 
Industrial dummies Yes   Yes  
Occupational dummies Yes   Yes  
Notes: *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. “High school dropout” is the omitted 
educational group. Source: The HSES, 2011-2017.
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EPHI insurance   -18293.26*** (311.13) 
Permanent income    0.43*** (0.01) 
Health spending  0.00*** (0.00) 1.44*** (0.16) 
Demographic variables     
   Age  0.05*** (0.01) -219.64 (156.92) 
   Age-squared  -0.07*** (0.01) 165.90 (196.50) 
   No. of emp.  0.00 (0.02) -436.92 (266.65) 
   No. of dep adults  -0.02 (0.01) -272.20 (194.98) 
   No. of children  -0.15*** (0.01) -1721.48*** (166.57) 
   Male  -0.21*** (0.02) -752.22** (295.73) 
   Married/co-habiting  0.09*** (0.02) -1549.32*** (317.87) 
Education     
   High school graduate  0.37*** (0.02) 1422.59*** (345.59) 
   Some college  0.81*** (0.04) 2620.86*** (509.66) 
   College degree or above  0.51*** (0.03) 1126.24** (495.18) 
Occupation     
   Technicians and associate professionals -0.31*** (0.05)   
   Service, sales and clerical support workers -0.70*** (0.04)   
   Craft and related trades workers -1.04*** (0.05)   
   Plant and machine operators, and assemblers -0.64*** (0.04)   
Other Variables     
   Mortgage debtor  0.47*** (0.04) 5407.14*** (446.40) 
   2013 dummy 0.08*** (0.03) 24.31 (345.64) 
   2015 dummy  0.06** (0.03) -731.73** (345.92) 
   2017 dummy  0.09*** (0.03) -843.97** (349.84) 
Constant  -0.15 (0.28) 12279.38*** (3786.98) 
Industrial dummies Yes Yes 
Notes: *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. “High school dropout” is the omitted 
educational group. “Legislators, managers, and professionals” is the omitted occupational group. Source: 
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
This dissertation investigates three main issues in economic research by focusing on 
developing countries. First, we investigate the age-earnings profiles and earnings 
uncertainties between the formal and informal sectors. Second, we examine the impact of 
earnings uncertainties from different sectors on earnings and consumption inequality over 
the life cycle. We also conduct policy experiments to investigate the impact of social 
insurance policy on inequality and individuals’ consumption and saving behavior.  Finally, 
we study the relationship between insurance coverage and precautionary savings.  
In chapter 2, we find that in a developing country like Thailand, formal workers 
have higher earnings than informal workers, and their earnings increases more 
significantly with age. Moreover, sector effect on the earnings growth is more significant 
than the effect of schooling. We find that even formal workers with lower education have 
higher earnings growth than informal workers with higher education.  
 We further examine the patterns of earnings shocks for workers in different 
sectors. We find that earnings shocks in the informal sector are greater than in the formal 
sector. However, the shocks are more persistent in the formal sector, indicating that it 
takes more time for formal workers to recover from shocks than informal workers. We 
also explore the difference in earnings shocks between age groups in each sector. We find 
that earnings shocks increase with age in both sectors. Our results also show that 
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persistence declines with age in the formal sector while slightly increases with age in the 
informal sector.  
In general, our findings conclude that working in the formal sector offers a 
substantially higher return than the informal sector in developing countries. Moreover, 
workers in the informal sector tend to suffer more than workers in the formal sector when 
they encounter earnings risks. An extension of social insurance, such as social security, 
would help alleviate the effect of earnings shocks.  
 In chapter 3, we investigate the inequality in earnings and consumption as well as 
consumption and saving behaviors over the life cycle in developing countries and ask 
whether the relationship between consumption inequality and age can be explained by a 
life cycle model with uninsurable earnings shocks from different sectors of employment. 
The model is calibrated to match Thai data. We find that key factors accounting for 
consumption inequality are the idiosyncratic earnings shocks in different sectors, working 
during old age, and social security. The different earnings shocks for different sectors of 
employment can explain earnings inequality. We also find that old-age employment and 
social security are important because it serves as insurance arrangements that are 
available in developing countries. In the absence of these two features, our model would 
generate 17% more consumption inequality.  
 We further propose two policy reforms, that is, the extension of social welfare and 
extension of the social security system. Our finding indicates that a high level of social 
welfare cannot reduce consumption inequality significantly, except those very young and 
very old. We also find that the extension of social security to cover the informal sector 
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Although old-age employment is available in most developing countries, our 
study suggests that the development of social security or pension benefits at old age is 
also essential. Moreover, our policy experiment suggests that the extension of social 
security to cover the informal sector is also preferred for developing countries.  
 In chapter 4, we investigate the association between employment-based/private 
health insurance (EPHI) coverage and private saving in Thailand. We find that, after 
controlling for endogeneity, households with EPHI coverage have significantly lower 
savings than those without coverage. Our finding provides evidence for the crowding-out 
effect of health insurance coverage on saving. This supports the theory of precautionary 
saving and confirms the significance of precautionary saving motive to reduce medical 
expenditure uncertainty. 
 According to our definition of informality, the insured thus refers to workers in 
the formal sector, and the uninsured are informal workers. Our results imply that informal 
workers who are not covered by EPHI tend to save more than formal workers as 
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